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Teaching Freedom: 
Exclusionary Rights of Student 
Groups 
Joan W. Howarth· 
Progressive, antisubordination values support robust First Amendment 
protection for high school and university students, including strong rights of 
expressive association, even when those rights clash with educational 
institutions' nondiscrimination policies. The leading cases addressing the 
conflicts between nondiscrimination policies and exclusionary student 
groups are polarized and distorted by their culture war context. That 
context tainted the leading authority, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, and is 
especially salient in the student expressive association cases, many of which 
are being aggressively litigated by religious groups with strong 
antihomosexuality goals. The strength of these First Amendment claims can 
be difficult to recognize in this context. Dean Howarth attempts to hold new 
ground, in which protecting the First Amendment association rights of 
exclusion by even antihomosexual student groups is consistent with a deep 
commitment to improved justice for sexual minorities. Dean Howarth 
discusses the leading high school and law school cases, and presents the 
strong First Amendment doctrinal analysis that should control. She 
critiques as weak the equality claim at stake in preventing a faith-based 
student group from limiting its membership and officers to adherents of that 
faith. To the contrary, nondiscrimination and equality for sexual minorities 
may be strengthened by greater separation between the expressive identities 
of educational institutions and those of student groups in the public forums 
• Dean, Michigan State University College of Law. This project was supported by 
a research assignment I enjoyed as William S. Boyd Professor of Law, Boyd School of 
Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Judy Cox (UNLV 2008), Ashley Hamrick 
(MSU Law 2010), and Hannah Bobee (MSU Law 2008) provided excellent research 
assistance, and Diana Gleason (UNl V) and Barbara Bean (MSU) contributed 
outstanding library support. My colleague Frank Ravitch offered thoughtful 
comments on an earlier draft. I thank them all, and the organizers of and partiCipants 
in the UC Davis Law Review symposium for which this was written. 
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established by the schools or universities. This is especially true in light of 
Establishment Clause developments that now protect religious groups within 
public schools and universities. Further, implementation principles can 
control the discriminatory impact within an institution of a discriminatory 
student group. In sum,forcingfaith-based student organizations to abide by 
school or university nondiscrimination policies does not Significantly 
advance equality and nondiscrimination rights for sexual minorities. 
Recognizing the First Amendment rights of even antihomosexual student 
organizations may be, in fact, the better path to LGBT rights and school 
environments in which LGBT students will have the safety, security, and 
support in which they can thrive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Who should win when student groups' First Amendment expressive 
rights clash with schools' nondiscrimination policies? This conflict 
arises when faith-based student organizations assert their rights to 
exclude students who do not subscribe to the groups' statements of 
faith, in apparent violation of the educational institution's policies 
prohibiting religious discrimination. If the religious group's creed 
includes opposition to homosexuality, the group's insistence on 
limiting membership to those who accept the creed may also implicate 
institutional policies prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. When the school has established a limited public forum 
and the group's exclusionary criteria is central to its identity, 
expressive association rights should trump nondiscrimination policies. 
Once a school or university establishes a limited public forum of 
student organizations,l under the logic of Roberts v. United States 
1 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.s. 819 
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jaycees2 and Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,3 ideological 
or faith-based student groups have expressive association rights to use 
their ideology or faith as a membership requirement. For instance, the 
High School Democrats can limit their membership and leadership to 
people who agree with the Democratic party, otherwise known as 
Democrats; the Vegetarian Society can limit its membership to 
students who support vegetarianism, even limiting the group to 
students who pledge not to eat meat; and the Christian Legal Society 
("CLS") should be able to limit its membership and leadership to 
people who share its version of the Christian faith. 
Few of us would spend much energy defending the right of a person 
who eats bacon for breakfast, burgers for lunch, and steak for dinner 
to become the President of the Vegetarian Society. Turning over the 
core values of the Vegetarian Society to meat-lovers could compromise 
its agenda beyond recognition. That, in short, explains why the First 
Amendment protects the right of expressive associations to exclude 
from membership and leadership those who do not support the core 
values of the association. The vegetarian example is simple, however, 
because educational institutions generally do not have policies that 
prohibit discrimination against carnivores. The issues are more 
complex when the school's nondiscrimination policy comes into play, 
such as if the CLS wants to restrict its membership to people who 
accept its doctrine, in apparent violation of a policy prohibiting 
discrimination based on religion or sexual orientation. 
Others also have argued that the First Amendment protects the right 
of student organizations in a limited public forum to control their 
membership based on the group's faith or ideology,4 but this Article 
(1995) (explaining that university created limited public forum by funding multiple 
student newspapers with diverse perspectives). 
2 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
3 481 U.s. 537 (1987). 
4 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the 
Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on "Equal Access" for Religious 
Speakers and Groups, 29 UC DAVIS L. REV. 653 (1996) (discussing interaction between 
Establishment Clause and First Amendment freedom of speech); Charles]. Russo and 
William E. Thro, The Constitutional Rights of Politically Incorrect Groups: Christian 
Legal Society v. Walker as an Illustration, 33].C. &: U.L. 361 (2006) (explOring Walker 
in light of constitutional rights of "politically incorrect" collegiate organizations); 
Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless: Public University Antidiscrimination 
Policies and Religious Student Organizations, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2882 (2005) (arguing 
that applying nondiscrimination policies that directly conflict with the core values of 
religious student groups challenges First Amendment protected freedom of 
association); Richard M. Paul III &: Derek Rose, Comment, The Clash Between the First 
Amendment and Civil Rights: Public University Nondiscrimination Clauses, 60 Mo. L. 
2009] Teaching Freedom 893 
may be distinctive in two ways. First, my analysis rests in part on 
skepticism about the line of Establishment Clause authority that has 
invited faith-based student organizations into public schools and 
universities.s Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, my argument is 
grounded in a deep commitment to equality and improved justice for 
members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT") 
communities. But forCing faith-based student organizations to abide by 
school or university nondiscrimination policies does not significantly 
advance equality and nondiscrimination rights for sexual minorities. To 
the contrary, recognizing the First Amendment rights of even 
antihomosexual student organizations may be, in fact, the better path to 
LGBT rights and school environments in which LGBT students will 
have the safety, security, and support in which they can thrive. 
Progressive, antisubordination values support robust First 
Amendment protection for high school and university students, 
including strong rights of expressive association. Morse v. Frederick,6 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier/ and Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School DistrictS have established that "the 
REV. 889 (1995) (exploring right of university religiOUS organizations to discriminate 
based on sexual orientation); Mark Andrew Snider, Note, ViewpOint Discrimination by 
Public Universities: Student Religious Organizations and Violations of University 
Nondiscrimination Policies, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841 (2004) (examining how court 
should reconcile derecognized student organization'S freedom of association with 
university's goal of total nondiscrimination on campus); Ryan C. Visser, Note, 
Collision Course?: Christian Legal Society v. Kane Could Create a Split over the Right of 
Religious Student Groups to Associate in the Face of Law School Antidiscrimination 
Policies, 30 RAMUNE L. REV. 449 (2007) (considering potential circuit split regarding 
whether CLS should be required to follow university nondiscrimination policies); cJ. 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Student Religious Organizations and University Policies Against 
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Implications of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 21 j.c. & U.L. 369 (1994) (argUing that religious student organization 
had RFRA rights, grounded in equal access and free exercise, to exemption from 
university policy prohibiting discrimination on basis of sexual orientation). But see, 
e.g., Anne K. Knight, Note, Striking the Balance Between Anti-Discrimination Laws and 
First Amendment Freedoms: An Alternative Proposal to Preserve Diversity, 30 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 249 (2007) (forcing student groups to comply with 
nondiscrimination policies does not violate First Amendment); Christian A. Malanga, 
Note, Expressive Association - Student Organizations' Right to Discriminate: A Look at 
Public Law Schools' Nondiscrimination Policies and Their Application to Christian Legal 
Society Chapters, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 757 (2007) (arguing that notwithstanding 
groups' First Amendment expressive rights, enforcement of nondiscrimination policies 
on CLS chapters and other religious-based student groups is justified). 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 145-54. 
6 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
7 484 U.s. 260 (1988). 
8 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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rights of students 'must be "applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment. ,,"'9 High schools (and later 
colleges and universities) are training grounds for participatory 
democracy, particularly as they provide opportunities for students to 
experience and grow into values of autonomy, pluralism, and 
equality. 10 The most crucial special characteristics of the school 
environment are those that reinforce the school's role as launching 
pad for effective participation in a vibrant democracy. II 
The First Amendment protects expressive associations because they 
are identity-forming, idea-forming entities. 12 This is why encouraging a 
variety of autonomous student groups is a central aspect of many 
schools' missions of preparing students to participate effectively in 
democracy. As Seana Shiffrin aptly claims, "Associations have an 
intimate connection to freedom of speech values in large part because 
they are special sites for the generation and germination of thoughts and 
ideas." 13 Expressive associations create opportunities for self-
expression, advocacy, tolerance, and autonomy. Schools may teach 
those values best by facilitating public forums for student organizations. 
The link between First Amendment freedoms and democratic 
participation attaches high value to students' free expression, 
including student control of student organizations, even when those 
student rights conflict with institutional nondiscrimination policies. 
Just as training wheels do not guarantee the safety of novice bike 
riders, educational laboratories for democracy cannot eliminate all 
risks of freedom or complexities of equality. Pluralism and freedom 
do not translate into a right not to be offended or even hurt. 14 In 
9 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.s. at 266 (internal 
citations omitted)). 
10 Hazelwood, 484 U.s. at 278 (Brennan,]., dissenting) (discussing role of public 
schools in educating young citizens on importance of participating in democracy). 
11 See generally Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal Theory of Freedom of ExpreSSion for 
Children, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2004) (theorizing about preparing children for 
adult roles in democracy). 
12 See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled 
Association?, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 839 (2005) (arguing that First Amendment value of 
expressive association is grounded not as much on external message of association as 
it is on association as site for development of autonomous thought); id. at 840-41 
(describing expressive associations as "special sites for generation and germination of 
thought and ideas"). 
13 ld. at 840-41. 
Ii Andrew Koppelman, You Can't Hurry Love: Why Anti-discrimination Protections 
for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 144-45 (2006) 
(challenging notion that "none of us needs to hear things that will hurt us"); id. at 126 
(" [Clonservative Christians ... like gay people, should be able to say what they 
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addition, we diminish our lessons about equality by insisting to 
students that equality means the right of a Republican to join the 
Democratic Club, the right of a meat-lover to join the Vegetarian 
Society, or the right of a Muslim to lead the CLS. 
The Second and Ninth Circuits have addressed conflicts between 
high school religious student organizations and nondiscrimination 
policies in Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District No. ys and Truth v. 
Kent School District,16 respectively. Hsu upheld the right of a high 
school Christian organization to limit its officers to Christians,17 but 
the court in Truth was deeply skeptical of any right of a Christian 
student group to limit its membership to Christians. The CLS has 
pressed similar issues at law schools across the country, achieving 
many negotiated victories,18 a Seventh Circuit victory in Christian 
Legal SOciety v. Walker/9 and a defeat in the Northern District of 
California in Christian Legal Society v. Kane,20 currently on appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit.21 The CLS cases escalate the intensity of the 
believe, however distressing that may be to their fellow citizens."). 
15 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996). 
16 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Truth Ill, amending 524 F.3d 957 (9th 
Cir. 2008), vacating Truth v. Grohe, 499 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Truth 1]. 
17 See inJra text accompanying notes 39-62. 
18 The CiS claims victories through negotiation or settlement of litigation at the 
University of South Carolina (see Press Release, ADF, CiS Suit Prompts Univ. of s.c. to 
Correct Funding Inequities Oune 23, 2008), available at http://www.alliancedefensefund. 
orglnews!story.aspx?cid=4577 (last visited June 26, 2008)); Florida State University (see 
Press Release, Christian Legal Society, Florida State Student Senate Reverses Its Decision 
to Pull Funding from Christian Legal Society (Feb. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.clsnet.orglclrfpageslpr_CiSvFSU.php); Ohio State University (see New Ohio 
State Policy Allows Religious Groups to Exclude Non-Believers, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE 
&: LOCAL WIRE, Oct. 1, 2004, at 1, available at LexisNexis Congressional Universe 
Academic); University of Toledo (see Plaintiffs Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without 
Prejudice, Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Toledo v. Johnson, No. 3:05-CV-
7126 (N.D. Ohio June 17, 2005)); and Arizona State University (see Plaintiffs 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Motion for Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs, Christian Legal Soc'y at Arizona State Univ. v. Crow, No. CV-04-2572-PHX-
NVW (D. Ariz. Nov. 7,2005)). 
19 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006). 
20 No. C 04-04484JSW, 2006 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 27347 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17,2006). 
21 The Eleventh Circuit is poised to address a very similar issue in Beta Upsilon 
Chi, Upsilon Chapter at the University oj Florida v. Machen. In Machen, a Christian 
Fraternity challenged the University of Florida's efforts to enforce its 
nondiscrimination policies against it. Beta Upsilon Chi, Upsilon Chapter at the Univ. 
of Fla. v. Machen, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (N.D. Fla. 2008), argued, No. 08-13332-EE 
(lIth Cir. Dec. 10, 2008). The 11th Circuit appeal of the district court denial of the 
fraternity'S motion for a preliminary injunction is pending. On July 30, 2008, the 
11 th Circuit issued an order without opinion granting the fraternity's interlocutory 
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political conflict beyond that of the high school cases because the ClS 
statement of faith limits membership and leadership to people who 
renounce sexual activity outside of marriage, including all same-sex 
sexual activity.22 Although the ClS denies that this aspect of its creed 
constitutes discrimination based on sexual orientation, law schools 
have challenged the ClS position as violating not only their 
prohibitions against religious discrimination, but also their 
prohibitions against discrimination based on sexual orientation.23 
Part I of this Article describes the leading decisions that address the 
tension between nondiscrimination policies and student organizations' 
exclusionary rights. The polarization of these decisions, greatly 
assisted by weaknesses in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,24 suggests that 
this difficult expressive association question is in danger of being 
improperly reduced to a simplistic referendum on lGBT rights. In 
some quarters, appreciation for expressive association rights of student 
groups is being rendered collateral damage in American culture wars. 
This Article attempts to take new ground, in which protecting the 
First Amendment association rights of even antihomosexual student 
organizations is consistent with a deep commitment to improved 
justice for sexual minorities. 
Part II provides the doctrinal analysis that should be controlling. 
First, although the fact that religion is both an identity and a belief 
system complicates the question, courts should recognize that denying 
only faith-based student groups the ability to constitute themselves 
based on core belief is viewpoint discrimination. Second, a group 
controlling its own message through exclusion of would-be 
nonconforming members is engaged in the kind of conduct that 
should receive full First Amendment protection. Third, the fact that 
student groups are expressive associations within limited public 
forums set up by schools and universities should not fatally 
undermine the force of those groups' expressive association claims. 
"Time Sensitive Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal." Corrective Order, Machen, 
No. 08-13332-EE (llth Cir. Jul. 30, 2008) (granting appellants' motion). 
22 The growing availability of same-sex marriage will have little impact on CLS 
policies regarding homosexuality, as the CLS is unlikely to recognize the validity of 
same-sex marriage. See, e.g., The Center for Law & Religious Freedom, The Advocacy 
Ministry of the Christian Legal Society, The Center Blog: Same-Sex-Marriage, 
http://religiousfreedom.blogspot.comlsearchilabeVSame-Sex-Marriage (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2008) (including blog postings commenting on how the evolving context 
concerning same-sex marriage will not significantly affect CLS policies regarding 
homosexuali ty). 
23 E.g., Walker, 453 F.3d at 860; Kane, 2006 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 27347, at *4. 
24 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.s. 640 (2000). 
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Finally, in this context, exclusion from membership on the basis of 
belief (that homosexuality is good) and exclusion on the basis of 
behavior (actively engaging in homosexuality) should be distinguished 
from exclusion on the basis of status or identity (being homosexual). 
Part III interrogates the equality claim at stake in enforcement of 
nondiscrimination policies in these controversies, and finds it to be 
weak. The principle of equality or nondiscrimination that insists on 
the right of Democrats to join the Young Republicans, or homophobes 
to join the Gay-Straight Alliance, or people who do not subscribe to 
the CLS statement of purpose to join the CLS, is an overly formal, 
inconsequential, empty version of equality. Many defenders of 
nondiscrimination policies in these conflicts tend to overvalue the 
equality right at stake because of its usefulness as a symbol of support 
for LGBT people, but more meaningful and less costly symbols would 
be preferable. 
Part IV develops the claim that conceptualizing the viewpoint and 
identity of the educational institution as distinct and separate from the 
viewpoint and identity of the exclusionary student organization is 
appropriate and necessary, and promotes three important collateral 
First Amendment goals. First, separation-of-church-and-state values 
are strengthened when public schools and universities distance their 
own expressive identities from the expressive identities of faith-based 
student groups permitted under current Establishment Clause 
doctrine. Next, recognizing the conceptual distance between the 
expressive identity of the institution and of the student group in this 
context offers a better and more consistent defense against the 
apparently growing pressure to require student speech to conform to 
the educational institution's values or mission. 25 Third, clearly 
delineating the difference between the voice of the student 
organization and the voice of the educational institution may help to 
rehabilitate the expressive identity of the educational institution, 
which the Court found hard to recognize in Rumsfeld v. FAIR. 26 
Part V suggests several limiting principles and operational 
guidelines for schools and universities when implementing 
2S Brief of Petitioner at 20-25, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) (No. 06-
278), 2007 WL 118979; Reply Brief of Petitioners at 10, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 
06-278),2007 WL 747754; see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, High-Value Speech and the Basic 
Educational Mission of a Public High School: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. III (2008) (warning against limiting student speech based on 
conformity to schools' educational mission). 
26 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.s. 47, 69-
70 (2006). 
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exclusionary rights of student organizations. The Conclusion 
reaffirms the strategic value to sexual minorities of principled 
protection of free expression for all students, even those deeply 
opposed to homosexuality. In sum, rather than focusing on limiting 
the expressive rights of antigay student groups, schools and 
universities should find more powerful ways to advance equality for 
LGBT students. 
1. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AS BATTLEGROUND IN THE CULTURE 
WARS 
A. Resisting the Dale Invitation 
The expressive association doctrine in Roberts,27 Rotary,28 and Dale29 
requires balancing the strength of the state's interest in 
nondiscrimination against the intrusive impact of forced inclusion on 
the expressive association. This weighing almost inevitably invites 
judgments on the relative importance of whatever principle of 
nondiscrimination is at stake, whether based on religion, sexual 
orientation, or something else. However, the cases addressing 
religious student organizations' expressive association rights have 
moved beyond this doctrinal balancing. They have instead become 
markedly polarized battlegrounds in what Michael McConnell has 
identified as a "seemingly irreconcilable clash" between the rights and 
interests of sexual minorities and the beliefs of some religious 
people.30 Antihomosexuality religious organizations are using 
aggressive litigation strategies to assert exclusionary expressive 
association rights.31 In reaction, and in the supercharged environment 
of the culture wars, Justice Scalia's "kulturkampf,"32 progressive 
people are undervaluing important free speech interests in their 
attempts to signal and create real support for LGBT equality. 
Willingness to fight the anti-homosexual religiOUS groups has become 
27 Roberts v. u.s. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 610 (1984). 
28 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 538 (1987). 
29 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
30 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1,43-44 (2000). 
31 The CLS, for example, has an aggressive and adamant litigation strategy to 
enforce the exclusionary rights of CLS chapters across the country. See Christian 
Legal Society Home Page, http://clsnet.org (last visited June 23, 2008). 
32 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.s. 620,636 (1996) (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
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a sign of commitment to equality for LGBT students, obscuring the 
First Amendment principles at stake.33 
The United States Supreme Court bears a large share of the 
responsibility for the polarization of these cases; the Court's treatment 
of similar issues in Dale succumbed to precisely this dynamic. Under 
Roberts and Rotary, expressive associations have First Amendment 
rights to control their membership, but they can only trump 
nondiscrimination policies if identity exclusion is at the heart of their 
expressive purpose.34 Thus, for example, under well-established 
analysis, the Ku Klux Klan could earn an exemption from prohibitions 
on race discrimination, because racism and hostility to people of color 
are central to its expressive identity.35 
In light of the strength of the state's statutory interest in enforcing 
equality for sexual minorities, to prevail in Dale the Boy Scouts should 
have had to establish that an antihomosexual message was central to 
their expressive identity.36 Instead of a serious examination of the 
expressive association interests at stake, however, the Court permitted 
the Boy Scouts to use the intensity of their desire to kick outJames Dale 
as a proxy for ideological commitment. Dale wrongfully undervalued 
the state's interest in nondiscrimination and inflated the Scouts' 
antihomosexual message, essentially giving the Scouts a free pass. 
Dale also blurred the distinction between identity and ideology in 
unhelpful ways. Dale makes it harder to see the principle that 
expressive associations should be able to organize themselves on the 
basis of belief, because Dale issued a loose invitation to use identity-
based exclusion (no homosexuals allowed) as a proxy for belief (we 
33 For example, the ACLU and the ACLU of Northern California entered the 
litigation between the CLS and Hastings College of Law as amicus curiae in support of 
Hastings, with analysis that properly recognized the very strong interest in 
nondiscrimination protection for LGBT students. See Brief for Am. Civil Liberties 
Union and Am. Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Hastings at 3-4, Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484JSW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 
2006), 2006 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 27347. Surprisingly, however, for civil liberties 
organizations, this analysis found that no cognizable associational interest of the CLS 
was implicated. See id. 
34 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 538 (1987); 
Roberts v. U.s. Jaycees, 468 U.s. 609, 618-19 (1984). 
3S In theory, under the logic of Rotary and Roberts, a student organization created 
precisely to advocate for exclusion or separation based on race, may have a First 
Amendment claim to discriminate on that basis in membership and leadership criteria. 
See Duarte, 481 U.s. at 538; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19. 
36 For a particularly effective discussion of this pOint, see Erwin Chemerinsky &: 
Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. &: MARY BILL RTS. J. 595, 
604-12 (2001). 
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oppose homosexuality). Nowhere in Dale is there any evidence that 
the Boy Scouts remove heterosexuals who advocate in favor of 
homosexuality.37 In other words, the Boy Scouts and the Court 
blurred any distinction between the ideological position of being anti-
homosexuality, and the exclusion of homosexuals. Dale permitted the 
Boy Scouts to create an ideological position through discrimination. 
The Court allowed the Scouts' desire to discriminate to substitute for 
any established organizational antigay message or ideology that had 
predated litigation. This reduced the analysis to a referendum on 
equality for sexual minorities, in which equality mattered little. No 
wonder LGBT groups and civil liberties organizations are approaching 
the exclUSionary student organization controversies with a passion to 
right the balance and restore LGBT nondiscrimination values. 
Unfortunately, this passion comes at the expense of expressive 
associational values.38 
B. Hsu and Truth: The High School Cases 
The Second and Ninth Circuits have adopted very different approaches 
to the exclUSionary rights of high school religious groups. The Second 
Circuit decision, Hsu,39 concerned a proposed high school student club 
called "Walking on Water." The purpose of the club was Christian 
fellowship, including singing, prayer, discussion, study, and guest 
speakers, with an overarching goal of gathering "to praise God. "40 As 
originally proposed, the club would have restricted membership to 
Christians, but after negotiations with the school authorities, the 
students opted for the more limited requirement that officers "accept ... 
Jesus Christ as savior."4! This proposed leadership requirement violated 
the school board's nondiscrimination policy, which provided that the 
37 For an excellent discussion of this point, see Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the 
Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1602 (2001). 
38 A similar dynamic has led to an unfortunate lack of sensitivity to speech rights 
of antigay students. See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th 
Cir. 2006), vacating as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007) (finding, in original opinion, no 
constitutional protection for antigay student speech); Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. 
Dist. # 204, No. 07 C 1586, 2007 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 94411 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21,2007) 
(evaluating First Amendment protection for "Be Happy, Not Gay" t-shirt that 
conflicted with high school tolerance policy); Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Sch., 293 F. 
Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (upholding Christian student's right to express in 
"What Diversity Means to Me" program that she could not accept religious or sexual 
orientation diversity). 
39 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996). 
40 Id. at 849. 
41 Id. at 849-50. 
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school board would not discriminate '''on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, creed or religion, marital status, sex, age or handicapping 
condition' in providing 'access to ... student activities."'42 
Following Hurley v. Irish American GLIB Ass'n43 and Roberts by 
analogy, the Hsu court recognized that the right of association 
includes a right not to associate,44 and that the initiating students' 
desire to control the leadership implicated expressive association 
rights. The court correctly noted that having leadership consistent 
with the specific goals of the club serves the purpose of any club: 
"The Club's leadership eligibility requirement on the basis of religion 
is therefore similar to a chess club's eligibility requirement based on 
chess. "45,, [M] any extracurricular clubs typically define 
themselves . . . by requiring that their leaders show a firm 
commitment to the club's cause."46 
The Hsu court properly grounded its analysis in the required nexus 
between the group's purpose for existence and its desired exclusionary 
principles, noting that a "hypothetical chess club that excluded 
Muslims could not claim that the exclusion was necessary to 
guarantee committed chess players. "47 The court determined that the 
42 ld. at 850. A second provision guaranteed that no student would be excluded 
on those enumerated grounds from "extracurricular activities." ld. 
43 515 U.s. 557 (1995) (upholding First Amendment right of parade organizers to 
exclude gay Irish contingent). 
ld. 
44 See Hsu, 85 F.3d at 858 (citing Roberts v. u.s. Jaycees, 468 U.s. 609, 623 (1984)). 
45 ld. at 860. 
46 ld. The court continued: 
[Ilt would be sensible - and unremarkable in light of the clubs' particular 
purposes - for the Students Protecting the Environment Against 
Contamination Club to require that officers have a demonstrated 
commitment to conservation or recycling; for Students Against Drunk 
Driving to require that officers have taken the pledge; or for Students for 
Social Responsibility to require that officers have a social conscience. 
Similarly, a hypothetical school scouting club could preserve its character 
and values by requiring that officers be exemplars of the scouting 
movement, just as a hypothetical Marxist discussion group could require 
that officers be dedicated to socialist values or be card-carriers. 
47 ld. at 861 n.20. As Alan Brownstein noted at this symposium, a situation of a 
group based on avocation and exclusion, such as a Muslim Chess Club, is a more 
difficult question. In a public forum a Muslim Chess Club should be permitted to 
exclude those who do not fit both aspects of their core expressive identity. However, 
educational institutions faced with such a student group can institute policies to limit 
the institutional impact of such a group's discrimination. See infra text accompanying 
notes 165-82. 
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exclusion must serve a "legitimate self-definitional goal for the group. 
This essential and direct link between the legitimate purpose of the 
club and the principle of exclusion necessary to achieve that purpose 
distinguishes the girls' soccer team and the Walking on Water Club 
from the hypothetical Chess Club. "48 
In Hsu, the Second Circuit recognized that the club's Christian officer 
requirement, as applied to the President, Vice-President, and Music 
Coordinator, is "essential to the expressive content of the meetings and 
to the group's preservation of its purpose and identity, and is thus 
protected by the Equal Access Act. "49 The court described Hurley as 
"instructive," finding that the Christian identity of the leaders of the 
student group implicated the group's "speech" Similarly to the way that 
inclusion of the group marching with a gay rights banner would 
impermissibly alter the Hurley parade organizers' "message."50 
The Hsu majority'S main error was to parse too tightly the notion of 
which activities were "religiOUS." The court found that "to the extent 
that such a group engages in social and community activities that are 
not integral to a sectarian religiOUS experience, it is in danger of 
becoming merely a religious affinity group practicing social 
exclusion. "51 In this vein, the court distinguished the more clearly 
worship-related speech activities at the meetings from the picnics and 
community service activities that the club had also proposed. 
Rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the Activities Coordinator 
would need to ensure that these activities did not offend "Christian 
sensibilities," the court declared that "an agnostic with an 
understanding of 'Christian sensibilities' might plan these activities as 
48 Hsu, 85 F.3d at 861 n.20. 
49 Id. at 848. The Equal Access Act prohibits public secondary schools that 
receive federal funding and that create a limited public forum for student 
organizations from denying equal access to students who want to conduct meetings 
based on the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at the 
meetings. Under the statute, a school has a "limited open forum" if it "grants an 
offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to 
meet on school premises during noninstructional time." 20 U.s.c. § 4071(a)-(b) 
(1984). According to the Hsu decision, there is no legislative history on the 
application of the Equal Access Act to exclUSionary membership policies. Hsu, 85 
F.3d at 854-55. The court also concluded that "[tlhis application of the Act is 
constitutional because the school's recognition of the club will not draw the school 
into an establishment of religion or impair the school's efforts to prevent invidious 
discrimination." Id. at 848. 
50 Hsu, 85 F.3d at 856-57. The Hsu court recognized that the "religious speech" of 
the club would be "in the nature of religious devotions." Id. 
s! Id. 
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well as any other student. "52 Thus, the court determined that the 
group's Activities Coordinator and Secretary no more needed to be 
Christian than anyone who attended the meetings, and that "a 
religious test for membership or attendance ... [would be] plainly 
insupportable. "53 
The court concluded, "[i] t is difficult to understand how allowing 
non-Christians to attend the meetings and sing (or listen to) Christian 
prayers would change the Club's speech."54 The Hsu majority 
overstepped by imagining that it could decide that the leadership of 
the Music Coordinator, for example, or the Secretary, need not be 
imbued with Christian faith. Secularizing the aspects of Christian 
fellowship that are furthest from traditional worship rituals may 
simply deliver a parched version of the Christian faith. 55 
Nonetheless, the Hsu court properly found that treating the religious 
group equally with the secular groups, as required by the Equal Access 
Act, required recognizing that religion is a belief or ideology, in 
addition to being a status. "UJust as a secular club may protect its 
character by restricting eligibility for leadership to those who show 
52 Id. "Similarly, it is very difficult to understand why the 'religious speech' at the 
Walking on Water Club meetings would be affected by having a non-Christian 
'Secretary,' whose principal duties are 'to accurately record the minutes of meetings 
and be involved in the Club's financial accounting and reporting.'" Id. 
53 Id. at 858. The court erred in combining as if identical the constitutional questions 
related to membership and attendance. In conjunction with ordinary procedures for 
conducting a group's business, mere attendance of nonbelievers holds little risk of 
misshaping the beliefs at the core of the group's identity. Membership, however, brings 
opportunities to shape the organization, which means that First Amendment expressive 
association values are implicated. In his concurrence and dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland 
also suggested that the Walking on Water Club may be able to limit its membership to 
Christians. Id. at 873 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing N.Y. State 
Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.s. 1, 13 (1988)). 
54 Id. at 858 n.17 (majority opinion). By this analysis, the Second Circuit 
separated the Activities Coordinator and the Secretary, who the court found did not 
need to be Christian, from the President, Vice-President, and Music Coordinator, who, 
by contrast, would ensure that the meetings would be "imbued with certain qualities 
of commitment and spirituality" to "make a certain kind of speech possible" and 
"affect the 'religious ... content of the speech at [the) meetings,' within the meaning 
of the Equal Access Act." Id. at 858 (footnote omitted). 
55 In his concurrence and dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland argued that because "the 
Club members are better qualified than are we to determine the duties and necessary 
qualities of all their leaders," the Walking on Water Club should be permitted to 
impose the requirement of being Christian on all of its officers. Id. at 874 (Van 
Graafeiland, J., concurring and dissenting); cJ. FRANK S. RA VITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 83 (2007) (noting that when 
government funding comes with strings attached, religious values of religious entities 
may be compromised). 
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themselves committed to the cause, the [plaintiffs] may protect their 
ability to hold Christian Bible meetings by including the leadership 
provision in the club's constitution. ,,56 The court found that the 
plaintiffs' concern that "students inimical to the Club's purpose" could 
take over the club was speculative, but "by no means unreasonable."57 
Three additional weaknesses mar the Hsu majority opinion. First, 
the court attempted a too-easy distinction between a religious group's 
desire to exclude based on religious ideology and "excluding others 
out of bias."58 Bigoted faiths exist. Second, the court asserted 
somewhat facilely that genuine religious grounds for exclusion will 
not stigmatize those excluded.59 The actual interplay between 
religious conviction, bias, and the stigma of exclusion is more 
complex. Although exclusion based on religious non-belief may not 
always carry the same stigma as exclusion on grounds of hatred or 
racism, it can be quite severe.60 Exclusion from religious community 
may carry with it the threat of eternal damnation, for example. 
Especially in the context of children and youth, exclusion for any 
56 Hsu, 85 F.3d at 861. 
57 ld. The Hsu court also suggested that the Equal Protection Clause would 
prevent clubs from discriminating against racial minorities, see id. at 867, that Tinker 
offers a strong tool for school officials to maintain good educational order, see id., and 
that the congressional hiStory of the Equal Access Act shows that it was not intended 
to protect "cults and hate groups." ld. at 867-68. The distinction between a protected 
religion and a nonprotected "cult" is suspect under First Amendment principles. 
58 ld. at 87l. 
59 ld. Regarding the Equal Protection issue, the Hsu court found that 
[nlothing in the record of the School's arguments suggest that the Walking 
on Water Club insists on Christian leaders because of animus against people 
of other religions. Since the Club exists solely to engage in Christian "praise 
of God," non-Christians suffer no articulable disadvantage by being unable 
to lead the Club's prayers and devotions. Nor is there any indication that 
the exclusion of non-Christians from Club leadership will subordinate or 
stigmatize them. Were any of these facts otherwise, the School might be 
justified in refusing an exemption from its nondiscrimination policy. 
ld. at 869 (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.s. 574, 604 (1983)). 
60 FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER &: DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF 
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES &: DISSENTERS 8-18 (1999) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992); Illinois v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.s. 203 (1948); Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 
F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1997); Bell v. Little Axe lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391 
(10th Cir. 1985); Religious Liberty: Hearings Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 104th 
Congo 1 (1995) (prepared testimony of Reverend James Forbes) (describing how 
students may be traumatized for not aligning with religious majority in public schoo\); 
Complaint of Herring, Herring v. Key, (M.D. Ala. 1997); 60 Minutes, Profile: Lisa 
Herdahl V. Pontotoc County: Mother Sues Public School over Prayer (television 
broadcast June 16, 1996)). 
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reason may cause some stigma or hurt. Third, the court found that 
"[ilt is undisputed that the decision by the Walking on Water Club to 
impose a religious test for leadership positions has been made purely 
for expressive purposes - to guarantee that meetings include the 
desired worship and observance - rather than for the sake of 
exclusion itself.,,61 What is exclusion for the sake of exclusion? Is 
there ever exclusion without a purpose? 
The Hsu court presented what it declared to be a narrow holding: 
[W]hen a sectarian religious club discriminates on the basis of 
religion for the purpose of assuring the sectarian religiOUS 
character of its meetings, a school must allow it to do so 
unless that club's specific form of discrimination would be 
invidious (and would thereby violate the equal protection 
rights of other students), or would otherwise disrupt or impair 
the school's educational mission.62 
Although wrapped in qualifications, the central theme of Hsu is 
appropriately protective of discriminatory expressive associations in 
high schools. 
The Ninth Circuit recently decided a similar set of issues very 
differently in Truth. 63 Like Hsu, Truth concerns a proposed Christian 
high school student group, in this case named "Truth," which wanted 
61 Hsu, 85 F.3d at 859. Revealing a perhaps naive distinction between 
discriminatory motives and sound ones, the court declared that "an exclusion solely 
for reasons of hostility or cliquishness, with no direct bearing or effect on the group's 
speech, does not implicate the right to expressive association." Id. 
62 Id. at 872-73. 
63 In its first decision in Truth, 499 F.3d 999, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth 
Circuit panel (Judges Wallace, Wardlaw, and Fisher) resoundingly affirmed the 
summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the school district and other 
defendants. Following a petition for rehearing en banc, on April 25, 2008, the same 
panel withdrew the original opinion and replaced it with a decision that retained 
much of the earlier analysiS, but reversed and remanded on the narrow question 
whether the plaintiffs could prove their allegation that the school district had 
impermissibly discriminated against religious groups by selectively enforcing its 
nondiscrimination policies. 524 F.3d 957, 960-64 (9th Cir. 2008). On September 9, 
2008, the decision was amended to add a concurrence joined by Judges Fisher and 
Wardlaw. Truth II, 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fisher,]., concurring). Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing En Banc was denied November 17, 2008. Order Denying 
Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Truth v. Kent Sch. 
Dist., No. 04-35876 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2008), 2008 WL 5273928. The Order denying 
rehearing en banc included an opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing filed by 
Judge Bea, jOined by Judge O'Scannlain, id. at 1-2 (Bea,]., dissenting), and an opinion 
concurring in the denial of rehearing filed by Judges Wardlaw and Fisher, id. at 1 
(Wardlaw,]., concurring). 
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to limit its members and leaders to Christians. As in Hsu, the student 
group attempted several times to gain recognition before litigating, in 
this case, on the basis of its third proposed charter. That third charter 
would have required any member or officer to sign a "statement of 
faith.,,64 The school district denied Truth's application as inconsistent 
with district policies and state statutes prohibiting discrimination 
based on creed or sexual orientation, among other identity categories. 
Although technically reconcilable with HSU,65 the sensibilities and tone 
of the Truth decision are markedly different. 
In assessing the Equal Access Act claim, the Ninth Circuit in Truth 
found that the club's "requirement that members possess a 'true desire 
to ... grow in a relationship with Jesus Christ' inherently excludes 
non-Christians.,,66 Instead of recognizing that the exclusion Truth 
sought would be based on both religious identity and on religious 
belief, the court saw only identity: "The [School] District denied 
Truth [recognized] status, at least in part, based on its discriminatory 
membership criteria, not the religious 'content of the speech."'67 
Incorrectly,68 the Ninth Circuit panel in Truth found that the 
nondiscrimination policy was content neutral, like a time, place, and 
manner limitation.69 Also incorrectly/o the Ninth Circuit suggested 
that Truth's goal of controlling its membership based on faith would 
constitute unprotected conduct, not speech.71 In other words, the 
Second Circuit in Hsu was divided in how far to extend the 
exclUSionary rights of the Christian student club Walking on Water, 
64 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 639. 
65 The Truth court decided only the issue of Truth's proposed membership 
requirements, which it rejected, whereas the Hsu court addressed leadership positions, 
and in dicta dismissed any right to restrict membership based on Christian faith. See 
id. at 647 (distinguishing Hsu). 
66 Id. at 968; Truth I, 499 F.3d at 1009 (same language in original opinion). 
67 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 645. In its first opinion, the panel wrote that" [t]he 
District has denied Truth [Associated Student Body] status not because of the 
religious 'content of the speech,' but rather because of its diSCriminatory membership 
criteria." Truth I, 499 F.3d at 1009. 
68 See infra text accompanying notes 105-13. 
69 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 647; Truth I, 499 F.3d at 1010. To the contrary, the Second 
Circuit in Hsu determined that equal treatment for the faith-based group required that it 
be permitted to control leadership on the basis of conformity to its purpose. Hsu v. 
Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No.3, 85 F.3d 839, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1996). 
70 See infra text accompanying notes 114-23. 
71 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 647 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)). 
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but the Ninth Circuit panel rejected any basis for the Christian group 
Truth to exclude non-Christians. 
In the third and most recent version of the decision, two members of 
the Troth panel added a concurrence to amplify the First Amendment 
expressive association analysis and soundly reject Truth's First 
Amendment argument. 72 Comparing expressive association rights in a 
limited public forum to more robust direct speech rights, the concurrence 
rejected Truth's First Amendment claim on grounds that the school 
district's policy was "viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the 
purpose served by the forum.,,73 As discussed below,74 in a limited public 
forum created to allow students to form groups on the basis of shared 
beliefs, preventing faith-based groups from using their beliefs to organize 
a group should not be dismissed as viewpoint neutrality. 
C. Walker and Kane: The Law School Cases 
In Walker/5 the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of a 
preliminary injunction requiring the law school at Southern Illinois 
University to recognize the CLS as a student group. The law school 
had denied the CLS recognition because it violated the school's 
nondiscrimination policies by excluding students who engage in 
unrepentant homosexual conduct. The CLS policy sits right in the 
muddled intersection of conduct and status: "CLS welcomes anyone 
to its meetings, but voting members and officers of the organization 
must subscribe to the statement of faith, meaning, among other things, 
that they must not engage in or approve of fornication, adultery, or 
homosexual conduct; or having done so, must repent of that 
conduct.,,76 The CLS told the law school that "a person 'who may have 
engaged in homosexual conduct in the past but has repented of that 
conduct, or who has homosexual inclinations but does not engage in 
or affirm homosexual conduct, would not be prevented from serving 
as an officer or member.",77 The Walker majority parsed the 
distinction between conduct and status and found no violation of the 
law school's policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation because "CLS requires its members and officers to adhere 
72 Truth II , 542 F.3d at 651 (Fisher, J., concurring). Judge Fisher wrote the 
concurrence, which Judge Wardlaw joined. ld. 
73 ld. at 65l. 
74 See infra text accompanying notes 105-13. 
75 453 F.3d 853, 867 (2006). 
76 ld. at 858. 
77 ld. 
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to and conduct themselves in accordance with 
regarding standards of sexual conduct, but 
requirements do not exclude members on the 
orientation. "78 
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a belief system 
its membership 
basis of sexual 
The Walker court based its analysis in large part on the conceptual 
separation of the CLS chapter's expressive identity from that of the law 
school. Correctly/9 the court explained that: 
there is no support in the record for the proposition that CLS 
is an extension of SIU. CLS is a private speaker, albeit one 
receiving (until it was derecognized) the public benefits 
associated with recognized student organization status. But 
subsidized student organizations at public universities are 
engaged in private speech, not spreading state-endorsed 
messages.80 
Unfortunately, the Walker majority opinion is blind to the equality 
values at stake from the perspective of the law school. Not even 
acknowledging the nondiscrimination interest, the Walker majority 
asked, "[wlhat interest does SIU have in forcing CLS to accept 
members whose activities violate its creed other than eradicating or 
neutralizing particular beliefs contained in that creed? SIU has 
identified none. "81 
Judge Harlington Wood dissented in Walker, shOWing skepticism 
toward the CLS as complete as the majority'S toward the law school. 
Judge Wood found that student organizations constitute educational 
opportunities within the meaning of the nondiscrimination policy. He 
also rejected the majority'S distinction between discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and discrimination based on sexual conduct, 
finding no evidence that the CLS actually applied its membership 
policy as it alleged. 82 Judge Wood used Lawrence v. Texas to assert 
78 Id. at 860. Noting that the policy also prevents unrepentant heterosexual 
adulterers from becoming members, the court accepted the CLS's argument that no 
one who engages in sexual relations outside of traditional marriage is eligible for 
membership or leadership. See id. 
79 See infra text accompanying notes 145-64. 
80 Walker, 453 F.3d at 861 (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. 
Southworth, 529 U.s. 217 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector &: Visitors of the Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.s. 819 (1995)). The Walker majority also argued that the Affirmative 
ActionlEqual Employment Opportunity policy probably did not apply because 
membership in the CLS did not constitute an "education opportunity." Id. at 860-6l. 
81 ld. at 863. 
82 ld. at 873 (Wood,]., dissenting). 
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that the university would be entitled to ban discrimination based on 
either orientation or conduct.83 
Reminiscent of Dale, Judge Wood's treatment of the CLS statement 
of faith (prohibiting all non-repentant sex outside of marriage) 
improperly conflates status and ideology. Judge Wood argued that the 
CLS statement of faith violated the law school's nondiscrimination 
policy because "CLS would prevent a person who openly affirmed his 
or her right to engage in homosexual conduct, as part of an intimate 
relationship with another person, from serving as an officer or 
member of the organization."84 In other words, Judge Wood equated 
exclusion of people who refuse to denounce their homosexuality with 
discrimination based on homosexuality. This is the flip side of the 
error perpetuated in Dale, in which the court permitted the Boy Scouts 
to equate the status of homosexuality with the ideology of being in 
favor of homosexuality.85 Sexual orientation status, behavior, and 
ideology overlaps are inevitably challenging, with precious few bright 
lines of distinction, but we should recognize that one's attitude about 
one's own homosexuality, whether pride or self-denunciation, 
constitutes an ideology or belief that is separate from the sexual 
orientation status itself. The Dale court wrongly conflated the two to 
justify the Boy Scouts' policy of discrimination, and Judge Wood 
wrongly conflated the two to invalidate the CLS policy of exclusion 
based on behavior and attitude.86 In short, the Walker majority 
applauded the CLS and dismissed the law school at every step, and the 
dissent came close to doing the opposite. 
The polarization revealed in these opinions escalates with Kane,87 
the district court opinion in the Hastings College of Law case that 
shares the same sympathies as the Walker dissent. Indeed, the Kane 
statement of the issue broadcasts what the result will be: 
83 ld. 
84 ld. at 868-70. On this issue, judge Wood bemoaned the lack of a record and 
suggested that a hearing would be needed to examine such questions as whether the 
CLS policy had been applied to heterosexual students who had engaged in sexual 
activities outside of marriage, or whether the CLS had admitted any non-sexually 
active gays. ld. at 869. 
85 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
86 judge Wood pOinted out that the CLS chapter constitution contains a 
nondiscrimination policy that conspicuously omits "sexual orientation" as a basis for 
protection, which he read as further evidence that the CLS policy was, indeed, a policy 
of discrimination based on status. Walker, 453 F .3d at 868 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
87 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484jSW, 2006 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 
27347, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17,2006). 
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This case concerns whether a religious student organization 
may compel a public university law school to fund its activities 
and to allow the group to use the school's name and facilities 
even though the organization admittedly discriminates in the 
selection of its members and officers on the basis of religion 
and sexual orientation.88 
This is noteworthy in part because the CLS chapter denies that it 
discriminates based on sexual orientation status; Hastings claims that 
the CLS does.89 
The district court in Kane first determined that the 
nondiscrimination policy targets conduct, not speech: 
Akin to Hurley, Roberts, [Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for 
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.s. 569 (1987)], and Evans, the Court finds 
that on its face, Hastings'[s] Nondiscrimination Policy targets 
conduct, i.e. discrimination, not speech. As in Rumsfeld, the 
Court finds that the Nondiscrimination Policy regulates 
conduct, not speech because it affects what CLS must do if it 
wants to become a registered student organization - not 
engage in discrimination - not what CLS mayor may not say 
regarding its beliefs on non-orthodox Christianity or 
homosexuality.90 
The Kane court continued, "In contrast to Hurley, CLS is not 
excluding certain students who wish to make a particular statement, 
but rather, CLS is excluding all students who are lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, or not orthodox Christian. ,,91 The court rejected the CLS's 
distinction between exclusions based on behavior and attitude rather 
than status: 
Although CLS argues that it does not discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation, but merely excludes students who engage 
in or advocate homosexual conduct, this is a distinction without 
a difference. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) 
(O'Connor, ]., concurring) (rejecting attempt to distinguish 
statute discriminating against "homosexual conduct" from one 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation: "While it is 
as ld. 
89 Brief of Appellee at 11, Kane, No. C 04-04484JSW. 
90 Kane, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347, at *23-24. Contrary to the court's analysis, 
the First Amendment protects a great deal that is "done" for expressive purposes, in 
addition to what is "said." See infra text accompanying notes 114-23. 
91 Kane, 2006 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 227347, at *24. 
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true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted 
by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being 
homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the State] sodomy 
law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed 
toward gay persons as a class.")92 
911 
The Kane court's analogy between the CLS statement of faith and 
the Texas anti-sodomy statute invalidated in Lawrence would be 
stronger if the CLS creed targeted only homosexual activity. Even so, 
the analogy fails to account for any First Amendment interests at stake 
in the expressive association context. Here, the CLS asserts that it 
seeks to exclude from membership all those who endorse homosexual 
conduct. Assuming the factual truth of these assertions - the CLS is 
excluding everyone, gay or straight, who approves of homosexuality, 
not just gay people - that is an ideology or belief that receives 
expressive assoCIatIOn protection. Dale's lack of precision between 
identity and belief invited this error, in the opposite direction, by 
using James Dale's identity as a too-easy proxy for endorsement of 
homosexuality. 
The Kane court next addressed the history of the CLS chapter at 
Hastings, noting that Hastings never interfered with the chapter's 
existence until it refused to sign the nondiscrimination policy.93 The 
record even reflects that, in its prior iteration, the group included one 
open lesbian.94 From this evidence the court concluded, "[a]s long as 
the organization admitted all students who wanted to join, it was free 
to express any ideas or viewpoints. It was not until CLS refused to 
comply with the Nondiscrimination Policy that Hastings withheld 
recognition."95 But, to those who recognize the particular version of 
Christian morality espoused by the CLS as a protected belief, this 
history suggests two more troubling possibilities: first, that the group 
changed its defining beliefs; and second, that the public law school 
prefers the more inclusive Christianity of the earlier organization. 
Turning to direct free speech analysis and the public forum 
question, the Kane court found that Hastings's policy is viewpoint 
neutraP6 The district court genuinely did not see any infringement 
92 Id. at *24 n.2 (some citations omitted). 
93 Id. at *24-25. 
94 Id. at *73. 
95 Id. 
96 The court expounded: 
CLS contends that Hastings engages in viewpoint discrimination because it 
prohibits CLS from using religion as a criteria for selecting members and 
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on the CLS's message or identity from forcing it to include people who 
endorsed sexual conduct outside of marriage: "Moreover, even 
assuming arguendo that Hastings'[s] condition for participation could 
be viewed as requiring CLS to admit gay, lesbian, and non-Christian 
students, CLS has not demonstrated that its ability to express its views 
would be Significantly impaired by complying with such a 
requirement. ,,97 
The Kane court distinguished Dale in part because Dale was himself 
a leader advocating for gay rights: 
The broad class of students CLS seeks to exclude significantly 
differs from the Boy Scouts' conduct in Dale. CLS does not 
confine its desired discrimination to students who are open 
and honest about being gay, lesbian, or non-orthodox 
Christian, let alone leaders on campus advocating for gay 
rights or non-Christian faiths. Rather, CLS seeks to exclude 
all lesbian, gay, bisexual or non-orthodox Christian students. 
See [Boy Scouts of Am. v.] Dale, [530 U.s. 640,] 653 [(2000)] 
(finding that because Dale was open and honest about his 
sexual orientation and was a gay rights activist, his presence 
would force the Boy Scouts to send a message to its youth 
members and the world regarding homosexuality).98 
In this way, the Kane court dismissed the idea that abiding by the 
nondiscrimination policy would have any adverse impact on the CLS's 
ability to remain true to its statement of faith. 99 
officers. CIS is confusing the appropriate analysis by focusing on the reasons 
CLS is acting, as opposed to the reasons underlying Hastings'[s] 
Nondiscrimination Policy. CIS also asserts that, as a religious group, it is 
unfairly disadvantaged. It argues that while other organizations, such as sports 
teams or political groups, may exclude students based on their athletic ability 
or political beliefs, CLS may not exclude the students of its choice. Again, CIS 
is confuSing the analysis by focUSing on the effect and the reason CLS is acting, 
as opposed to the reasons underlying Hastings'[s] conduct. 
[d. at *40-41 (citations omitted). 
97 [d. at *67. 
98 [d. at *69-70 (some citations omitted). 
99 The court wondered, "[Ilt is not clear how anyone at Hastings, other than the 
individual members and officers, would even be aware that CIS's members and officers 
are living their private lives in accordance with a certain code of conduct." [d. at *72. 
Yet, there is no indication that the participation of such students made the 
organization any less Christian or hampered the organization's ability to 
express any particular message or belief. Nor is there any evidence that 
during those ten years students hostile to CIS's beliefs tried to overtake the 
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The polarization in these decisions is striking. Dale's dismissive ness 
toward the state's goal of equality for sexual minorities gave expressive 
association a bad name and made addressing these issues in a 
principled way much more difficult. Progressives' backlash reaction, 
urging the importance of equality for sexual minorities by minimizing 
the value of associational interests, is understandable but incorrect. 
Rather than erasing the central value of the expressive associational 
interests, the better analysis rehabilitates them along with the true 
equality interests at stake. That is the project of this Article. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR EXCLUSIONARY STUDENT 
GROUPS 
Public schools or universities may sponsor faith-based student 
organizations within the context of limited public forums of expressive 
associations. 100 Attracting members based on ideology or belief is 
inherent in the concept of a public forum of expressive associations, 
including those of student groups. Therefore, the better limited public 
forum analYSis protects the group's exclusionary right when it is closely 
tied to the central purpose and identity of the student organization. The 
strongest doctrinal treatment rests on four fundamental points. First, 
forcing student organizations to abandon core membership criteria to 
conform to nondiscrimination policies is impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination. 101 Second, limiting group membership to those who 
share the group's founding belief or ideology is expressive activity fully 
protected by the First Amendment, not unprotected conduct. 102 Third, 
the fact that the public school or university provides material or 
symbolic support to student organizations within the school's limited 
public forum does not diminish the First Amendment protection within 
that forum. 103 Finally, distinguishing between status, belief, and 
behavior is often necessary. 104 
organization or alter its views. 
Id. at *73; cf Shiffrin, supra note 12 (emphasizing internal meaning of ideology, rather 
than outward-directed message). 
100 See Rosenberger v. Rector &: Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.s. 819, 829-30 (1995). 
101 See infra text accompanying notes 105-13. 
102 See infra text accompanying notes 114-23. 
103 See infra text accompanying notes 124-34. 
104 See infra text accompanying notes 135-38. 
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A. Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Policies Is Viewpoint 
Discrimination when It Forces Student Groups to Abandon Core 
Membership Criteria 
A public forum exists to create a diversity of perspectives and 
viewpoints. Expressive associations, by definition, are organized 
around particular perspectives or viewpoints. In Roberts, for example, 
the Court recognized that "[t]here can be no clearer example of an 
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a 
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not 
desire."105 Freedom to associate "plainly presupposes a freedom not to 
associate." 106 Thus, student organizations need ideological protection 
for membership and leadership. 
To create a public forum that includes organizations whose 
organizing principle is religious belief and yet not permit those 
organizations to make distinctions based on that faith is almost 
incoherent. In other words, religion is an ideology (in addition to 
being an identity category), and preventing only religious 
organizations from constituting themselves based on their ideology is 
not neutral. I07 When viewed from the perspective of the faith-based 
organization, it is being subjected to a viewpoint-based limitation 
when it is forbidden from establishing itself on the basis of belief 
because its belief is religious. 108 
Many who insist on enforcing nondiscrimination policies see 
religion as identity or status; many who assert the right of a religious 
group to control its membership based on faith view religion as a 
belief system. A religion is both and much more. Therefore, 
characterizing religion as either an identity or a belief does not answer 
the question of how to apply nondiscrimination policies to religious 
groups. Enforcement of nondiscrimination policies against religious 
student groups can be understood to be enforcement of a neutral 
policy, and, just as logically, to be viewpoint discrimination that 
Singles out only religious groups. The better argument, however, is 
that denying only faith-based student groups the ability to require 
105 Roberts v. U.s. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
106 ld.; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.s. 640, 648 (2000). 
107 Cj. Rosenberger v. Rector &: Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.s. 819, 861-62 
(1995) (denying funding of religious newspaper on Establishment Clause grounds in 
public forum constituted impennissible viewpoint discrimination). 
lOS See William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 68, 78-80, 90-91 (1986) (arguing that rather than allowing liberty and equality 
to compete at abstract levels, nondiscrimination should trump unless it would destroy 
viability of association). 
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conformity with core beliefs is viewpoint discrimination. Otherwise, 
the application of the nondiscrimination policy against faith-based 
groups undermines the very purpose of the nondiscrimination policy: 
protecting religious freedom. Protection of expressive association 
requires that discrimination based on belief be recognized and 
controlling, even when it also constitutes discrimination based on 
one's religious identity. 
The Second Circuit in Hsu nicely recognized that "equal access" 
under the Equal Access Act does not mean uniformity. To the 
contrary, Hsu suggested that a "no hat" rule could deny Jewish 
students equal access for after-school religious purposes and a "shoes 
required" rule could compromise a yoga club: 
The neutral application of the School's rules allows the School 
to say that it is treating all clubs equally. But exemptions from 
neutrally applicable rules that impede one or another club 
from expressing the beliefs that it was formed to express, may 
be required if a school is to provide "equal access. "109 
Although the Hsu court was interpreting the Equal Access Act, the same 
understanding of contextualized, substantive equality should inform the 
concept of neutrality that is central in First Amendment analysis. 
In rejecting the Southern Illinois University's position, the Walker 
majority described the law school's nondiscrimination policy as 
"viewpoint neutral on its face,"llo but suggested that there might be 
evidence that the policy had not been applied in a viewpoint neutral 
way. Specifically, the CLS alleged that the law school permitted other 
student groups to violate the nondiscrimination policy, such as by 
allowing the Muslim Student Association to limit membership to 
Muslims, and the Adventist Campus Ministries to limit itself to those 
'''professing the Seventh Day Adventist Faith."'lll 
Conversely, in rejecting the student group's First Amendment claim, 
the Ninth Circuit concurrence in Truth emphaSized that the school 
district set up only a limited public forum, and declared without 
analysis that the school district's restrictions based on its 
nondiscrimination policy were '''viewpoint neutral and reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum."'ll2 Similarly and 
109 Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No.3, 85 F.3d 839, 860 (2d Cir. 1996). 
llO Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2006). 
III Id. Similarly, Truth II reversed and remanded for a determination whether the 
school district that denied recognition to the student group Truth had selectively 
enforced its nondiscrimination policies. Truth II, 542 F.3d 634,648 (2006). 
112 Truth II, 542 F.3d at 651-52 (Fisher, j., concurring) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 
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unsurprisingly, as described above, the Kane court found the 
Hastings's nondiscrimination policy to be viewpoint neutral, even as 
applied, although the CLS pointed to the rules of other student 
organizations that limited membership based on interest or purpose. ll3 
A deeper analysis leads to a conclusion contrary to the Truth and 
Kane courts' holdings. To summarize, courts and advocates cannot 
depend on decontextualized logic to determine the viewpoint 
discrimination issue, but rather must look at why religion is a 
protected category in nondiscrimination policies. Religion as identity 
is included along with other protected identities in nondiscrimination 
policies to protect religiOUS faith. But that protected status effectively 
singles out religion as belief for uniquely unfavorable treatment when 
all non-faith-based beliefs (for example, vegetarianism, or advocacy for 
school spirit) are protected through club memberships, but faith-based 
groups are not. Therefore, courts should recognize that preventing 
only faith-based groups from using membership criteria to protect 
their expressive purposes is viewpoint discrimination. 
B. Controlling One's Message Is Expressive Activity Protected by the 
First Amendment 
The ACLU and school districts that prefer nondiscrimination policies 
to trump the expressive associational right of student organizations to 
control their groups' messages argue that discrimination is conduct, not 
speechY4 However, under United States v. O'Brien,ll5 controlling the 
ideological message of an expressive association is the very kind of 
conduct that requires First Amendment protection, because the 
governmental interest in preventing this control is directly related to the 
suppression of free expression. 1l6 On this issue, too, the Walker, Truth, 
u.s. at 829). 
113 See supra note 96. 
114 E.g., Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hastings 
College at 3, 18 n.8, Kane, No. C 04-04484 ]SW. 
115 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
116 O'Brien set forth the test for First Amendment protection for conduct: 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated 
to the suppression of free expresSion; and if the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest. 
ld. at 377. But see Chemerinsky &: Fisk, supra note 36, at 595, 601 (evaluating 
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and Kane opmIOns talk past each other. Each places the group's 
discriminatory control of message into either the conduct or the speech 
category, depending on whether the court sees the discrimination or the 
control of message. 
The Sixth Circuit Walker majority recognized the significant impact 
that enforcement of the nondiscrimination policy would have on the 
CLS message. The court explained, "[0] ur next question is whether 
application of SID's antidiscrimination policy to force inclusion of 
those who engage in or affirm homosexual conduct would 
significantly affect CLS's ability to express its disapproval of 
homosexual activity. To ask this question is very nearly to answer 
it."ll7 The court continued, "[t]here can be little doubt that requiring 
CLS to make this change would impair its ability to express 
disapproval of active homosexuality. "liB 
The Ninth Circuit decision in Truth, however, rested in large part on 
the finding that the Christian high school group's desire to limit its 
membership to Christians constituted unprotected conduct. The 
Ninth Circuit drew from Healy v. James 1l9 that the "Court did not 
condemn incidental infringements on the students' associational 
rights, so long as the school's reason for denying official recognition 
was 'directed at the organization's activities, rather than its 
philosophy.ml 2o Following Healy in calling for application of the 
O'Brien test, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the expressive issues: 
discrimination as unprotected conduct under O'Brien). 
Id. 
117 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2006). 
llS Id. at 863. The Walker court elaborated: 
CLS is a faith-based organization. One of its beliefs is that sexual conduct 
outside of a traditional marriage is immoral. It would be difficult for CLS to 
Sincerely and effectively convey a message of disapproval of certain types of 
conduct if, at the same time, it must accept members who engage in that 
conduct. CLS's beliefs about sexual morality are among its defining values; 
forcing it to accept as members those who engage in or approve of homosexual 
conduct would cause the group as it currently identifies itself to cease to exist. 
We have no difficulty concluding that SIU's application of its nondiscrimination 
policies in this way burdens CLS's ability to express its ideas. 
ll9 408 U.s. 169 (1972). Healy addressed First Amendment protections for student 
organizations in the context of university recognition of and subsidies for the student 
groups. 
120 Truth I, 499 F. 3d 999, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.s. 
169, 188 (1972». 
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Truth has not established that its policy of excluding persons 
who do not share Christian values from its general membership 
has any expressive content, let alone that this policy 
communicates a message consistent with the views of the club's 
organizers. Truth has thus failed to show the required 
incidental infringement of a First Amendment interest. 121 
Similarly, the Kane district court relied heavily on O'Brien to 
categorize the CLS's discriminatory control of its membership as 
conduct, not speech. It also relied on O'Brien to find that: 
the Nondiscrimination Policy furthers a governmental interest 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression - protecting 
students from discrimination. Furthermore ... the facts [in 
Kane], including Hastings'[s] recognition of a predecessor of 
CLS for the previous ten years, confirm that Hastings'[s] 
Nondiscrimination Policy is directed at conduct related to the 
suppression of expression. 122 
The Kane court also found the last prong of O'Brien, whether the 
government intrusion was no greater than necessary, to be easily 
satisfied by again categorizing what Hastings prevented as conduct, 
not speech. "[T]he [c]ourt notes that the Nondiscrimination Policy 
only targets the conduct of discrimination. As long as student groups 
do not exclude students based on the prohibited categories, the groups 
are free to express any beliefs or perspectives they choose." 123 
Discrimination based on identity generally is conduct without First 
Amendment protection unless, for example, the discrimination is a 
core aspect of the expressive identity of the organization. Controlling 
the ideological message of the association is expressive activity that 
should be protected by First Amendment principles, not simplistically 
rejected with the label "conduct." The CLS's discriminatory 
membership practice of excluding all those who reject the CLS 
statement of faith, for example, is prohibited under nondiscrimination 
policies precisely because it makes distinctions based on ideology. 
III ld. at 1Ol3. Expressing the same idea more successfully, Eugene Volokh argues 
that "antidiscrimination rules are content-neutral" in that the exclusion is "based on 
the groups' conduct [of discrimination], not the groups' ideas [that are the reason for 
the discrimination]." Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and 
Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1930-31 (2006) (citing, among others, 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.s. 476, 489 (1993)). 
122 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 
27347, at *29-30 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17,2006). 
123 ld. at *31. 
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Discrimination based on ideology is almost pure speech, and goes to 
the heart of the ability of the expressive association to control its own 
message. Under O'Brien, preventing student groups from using 
ideological or faith-based criteria for membership is directly related to 
suppression of expression, and therefore should trigger First 
Amendment protection. 
C. Student Groups Need Not Choose Between Recognition and the First 
Amendment 
The fact that a public school or university provides material or 
symbolic support to student organizations within the school's limited 
public forum does not diminish those organizations' First Amendment 
protections within that forum. In an elegant treatment of this issue, 
Professor Eugene Volokh argues that a "No Duty to Subsidize 
Principle" means that a public university "may decide to make its 
classrooms and student group funds ... available only for events at 
which people are welcome without regard to religion and sexual 
orientation"l24 and that universities can also decide to provide 
subsidies "only when the officers are chosen nondiscriminatorily."125 
However, Volokh's analysis uncharacteristically undervalues the 
expressive interests at stake, and overly relies on the theories of Rust v. 
Sullivan,126 the closely divided reproductive rights funding case in 
which the Court found that government subsidies eviscerated First 
Amendment rights. Rust was not a public forum case, however. 
Having chosen to create a public forum , 127 a school or university 
cannot impose its own viewpoint or content-based rules on the 
student organizations. Rather than resting on Rust, the better analysis 
124 See Volokh, supra note 121, at 1926. 
125 rd. Volokh agrees that imposing nondiscrimination rules on student groups 
may not be good policy, because groups that discriminate can contribute to a 
"diversity of views" and "ought to be included within general benefit programs aimed 
at promoting such diversity." rd. at 1926-27. 
126 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
m In Hazelwood, the court noted that, 
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and 
other traditional public forums .... Hence, school facilities may be deemed 
to be public forums only if school authorities have "by policy or by practice" 
opened those facilities "for indiscriminate use by the general public," or by 
some segment of the public, such as student organizations. 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.s. 260,267 (1988) (citations omitted). 
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relies on HealyYs Healy recognized that schools and universities 
cannot ignore free speech rights of student groups simply because they 
are operating within a school or university context. The Court held 
that "denial of official recognition, without justification, to college 
organizations burdens or abridges that associational right."129 Indeed, 
Healy recognized that non-recognition of a student group constituted 
a prior restraint, and that a '''heavy burden' rests on the college to 
demonstrate the appropriateness of that action."130 
Predictably, the Walker and Kane courts addressed this issue too 
with polar opposite analyses. In Walker, the Seventh Circuit used the 
public forum precedent of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University 
of Virginia and relied heavily on Healy to emphasize that subsidized 
student organizations in a public forum are private speakers. 13l The 
court rejected the law school's claim that rather than being a "forced 
inclusion" case, such as Dale or Hurley, this was a simple case of 
whether an association could benefit from institutional recognition. 132 
In contrast, Judge Wood's dissent distinguished Healy and Dale 
because "CLS is trying to force an affiliation between itself and a state 
institution."133 
Also predictably, the district court decision in Kane found that the 
context of university recognition limited any otherwise applicable 
First Amendment rights. The district court emphasized Boy Scouts of 
America v. Wyman,134 in which the court upheld Connecticut's policy 
of excluding the Boy Scouts from a workplace contribution program (a 
subsidy) because the Boy Scouts failed to abide by the program's 
nondiscrimination policy. The court should have distinguished 
128 See Healy v. James, 408 U.s. 169 (1972). 
129 Id. at 181. The Court continued, "Freedoms such as these are protected not 
only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle 
governmental interference." Id. at 183 (citations omitted). 
130 Id. at 184 (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.s. 697, 7l3-16 (1931)). 
13l See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 860-61 (2006) (citing 
Rosenberger v. Rector &: Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995)) 
(explaining difference between government funding of private groups to spread 
government-controlled message and government funding of private groups simply to 
encourage diversity of views from private speakers); see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.s. 217, 229, 233 (2000). 
132 See Walker, 453 F.3d at 864. 
133 Id. at 875 (Wood, J., dissenting). Judge Wood worried that student 
organizations that want to discriminate based on race should be reqUired to sustain 
themselves without state support, "even if it could root such a membership policy in a 
religious text." Id. 
134 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Wyman, 335 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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Wyman, however, because it did not involve a public forum. The 
creation of a public forum protects strong expressive association 
rights, even in the school context. 
D. Attention to the Interplay of Belief, Status, and Conduct Is Required 
First Amendment expressive association rights protect a group's 
ability to control its message by controlling its membership. Thus, an 
expressive association's right to control its membership based on belief 
or ideology is a relatively easy case. As reflected in the varying 
approaches of the Second and Ninth Circuits in Hsu and Truth, religion 
adds some categorical confusion because it is both a protected belief and 
the prohibited exclusionary category of identity. Belief and identity also 
may implicate behavior. Describing someone as a Christian, or as gay, 
suggests something about identity, belief, and behavior. A question that 
divided the Hsu panel - whether some of the more secular or social 
activities of Walking on Water could be led by non-Christians -
demonstrates the complex interplay between belief, identity, and 
behavior. The Hsus claimed that all activities of the Walking on Water 
club were meant to glorify Jesus Christ, and therefore all officers needed 
to be Christians. 135 From the position of that faith, planning a picnic for 
the glory of Jesus Christ is a different activity, resulting in a different 
picnic, than one planned for a different purpose. 
The complexities of belief, identity, and behavior are even more 
central in the CLS litigation. First, of course, as with Walking on 
Water and Truth, the CLS litigation-backed drive to limit its 
membership to those who accept its statement of faith is itself faith-
based activity. It is a statement that those members' faith must be 
lived, not simply considered. Just as the Hsus recognize a difference 
between a picnic planned for the glory of Jesus Christ and a picnic 
planned by a non-believer, the CLS sees a difference between a faith-
based organization with shared commitments and an otherwise 
identical organization without the shared commitments. 
A Vegetarian Caucus whose membership is bound by a pledge not to 
eat meat has a different identity and message than a Vegetarian Caucus 
without that pledge. If the CLS indeed exists in large part to address 
the question "what does it mean to be a Christian in law?," 
establishing specific behavioral and attitudinal requirements for 
membership and leadership appears central to the expressive identity 
of the organization. 
135 Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No.3, 85 F.3d 839, 857 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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The fact that the CLS shared commitment includes renunciation of 
certain sexual activity throws the CLS's litigation into the interlocking 
complexities related to belief, identity, and behavior of sexual 
orientation. In this context, exclusion on the basis of forbidden belief 
(that homosexuality is good) and exclusion on the basis of behavior 
(actively engaging in homosexuality) should be distinguished from 
exclusion on the basis of status or identity (being homosexual). 
Attention to those distinctions suggests that the CLS's exclusion of 
anyone who endorses sex outside of marriage is not discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. 
Dale made this distinction harder to see by blurring the line between 
belief and identity, improperly using desire to discriminate as proof of 
belief. The Dale Court erred by deferring wholesale to the Boy Scouts' 
poorly supported claim that opposition to homosexuality was a core 
Boy Scout belief. First Amendment freedoms, however, do require 
some deference to the expressive association's self-definition. Judge 
Wood may be correct in his Walker dissent that a nondiscrimination 
policy protecting people who engage in certain behaviors may be 
necessary to defeat the CLS claim. However, such a nondiscrimination 
policy would be quite different from typical nondiscrimination 
policies, which generally focus on status rather than behavior. Judge 
Wood's willingness to move into that arena signals an admirable 
impulse to protect sexual minorities, but may not be equally protective 
of implicated First Amendment issues. 
The CLS cases are especially complex because they combine 
exclusion based on religion, and exclusion based on sexual attitudes 
and conduct that are imbedded in the religious discrimination. As to 
the religious exclusion, discriminating against non-Christians is 
discriminating against an expressive category (people who do not 
believe in the group's defining faith) that is also an identity category 
(people who are the wrong religion). The belief defines the identity. 
The courts and parties that analyze these issues in polar opposite ways 
either see the discrimination as based on belief, which is permissible, or 
see the discrimination as based on identity, which is not. In fact, the 
discrimination is both. Protection of expressive association requires 
that the discrimination based on belief be recognized and controlling. 
The sexual orientation issues also combine multiple aspects. The 
CLS claims that it is discriminating based on attitudes about 
sexuality. 136 The opposing law schools contend that what the CLS 
136 E.g., Reply Brief at 19-20, Christian Legal Soe'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 jSW 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 17,2006),2006 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 27347. 
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calls discriminating against certain beliefs (endorsement of 
homosexuality) is the same thing as discriminating based on sexual 
orientation. 137 In terms of the impact on LGBT students and their 
allies, it probably is the same. Protection of expressive association 
principles, however, requires a finer analysis. If the CLS in fact does 
not impose its belief requirements regarding sexuality on 
heterosexuals as well as gay people, the law schools have the better of 
the argument. If the evidence establishes that the CLS applies its 
beliefs about the immorality of sexual conduct outside of marriage 
evenly to heterosexuals and gay people, as the CLS alleges, the conflict 
with a policy of nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation 
disappears, leaving only the conflict based on religion. With that 
simplification, the CLS cases can be understood as analytically 
equivalent to the high school cases of Hsu and Truth, again asking 
whether a policy against religious discrimination can be asserted 
against a faith-based student organization. 
For First Amendment purposes, a membership policy requiring 
renunciation of homosexual activity is analytically distinct from 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, the very real 
harm to LGBT students and their allies in the educational institution 
cannot be so easily erased, and should not be minimized. The First 
Amendment requires protection of some hostile private speech, but it 
does not require institutional silence or neutrality on sexual 
orientation. An educational institution that professes to condemn 
discrimination against LGBT students should act affirmatively to 
ameliorate the hostile impact of anti-homosexual attitudes, whether 
expressed by student clubs that discriminate, student clubs that do not 
discriminate, or anyone else. 138 
III. No MEANINGFUL THEORY OF EQUALITY OR PRACTICE OF 
NONDISCRIMINATION Is AT STAKE 
Equality and nondiscrimination are too precious to be reduced to 
the silly formalities of insisting that faith-based organizations cannot 
discriminate on the basis of faith. We do not really expect student 
organizations to ignore their defining purposes in selecting members 
and officers, and the pretense that we do is causing an unnecessary 
137 E.g., Brief of Appellees at 8-9,9 n.8, Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW. 
138 See, e.g., Chai Feldblum, SolomonResponse.Org, http://www.law.georgetown.edui 
solomonlsmaterials.html (last visited June 26, 2008) (providing examples of activities 
that institutions and students can undertake to protest and ameliorate presence of 
discriminatory employers on campus). 
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and harmful battle that pits equality for LGBT people against First 
Amendment rights of students. 
Consider a student who votes for the Christian candidate to be the 
President of the Christian Student Association. The student believes 
the non-Christian candidate is generally more capable, but she thinks 
that a Christian should lead the Christian student organization. As a 
normative matter, nothing is wrong with that preference. It is neither 
immoral nor unjust, nor is it invidious discrimination. J39 
Student organizations that do not object to formal 
nondiscrimination policies may in fact endorse positions regarding 
gender relations and sexual orientation that are highly offensive or 
discriminatory to other students, and perhaps directly contrary to the 
institution's nondiscrimination values. A conservative religious 
student organization that does not formally discriminate based on any 
protected status, may advance a substantive position regarding sex 
roles and sexual orientation that is directly contrary to a law school's 
commitment to equal opportunity for women and sexual minorities. 
The group's formal inclusive membership policy could be 
accompanied by a relentless pattern of heterosexual male leadership, 
antiwoman and anti-LGBT speakers, and a hostile atmosphere toward 
women and LGBT students. If nondiscrimination really only means 
formal poliCies of membership and leadership inclusion - even when 
accompanied by habits, patterns, policies, politics, and cultures of 
discrimination and exclusion - it does not mean much. Providing a 
law school's blessing, sanction, approval, or recognition to a group 
that actively promotes sex stereotypes and undermines LGBT rights 
simply because the group does not formally discriminate regarding 
membership or leadership promotes a watered-down notion of 
discrimination and equality. 
Indeed, I fear that schools and universities may fetishize these 
formal nondiscrimination policies when applied against unpopular 
student organizations, while ignoring violations that are long-standing 
aspects of student life. 14O Hidden majoritarian premises and habits 
render the sex-segregated clubs and sports invisible, in spite of 
139 In Hsu, the Second Circuit recognized that the school district's argument that 
students could elect leadership based on religious affiliation would be simply hiding 
the same religious-based leadership determination behind student voting preferences, 
denying non-Christians the same opportunity to serve as leaders. 85 F.3d at 861. 
140 Cf Kevin W. Saunders, The Need for a Two (or More) Tiered First Amendment to 
Provide for the Protection of Children, 79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 257, 273 (2004) (asserting 
that "the real harm" in Tinker was "attempt to squelch one side of a debate and only 
allow the expression of the other"). 
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nondiscrimination policies explicitly including sex. HI For example, 
cheerleading squads, sports clubs, and service clubs routinely 
distinguish between boys and girls, or men and women. 142 In Truth, 
for example, the court invalidated the Christian organization's ability 
to restrict membership based on commitment to Jesus Christ, but was 
initially untroubled by the sex-segregated Girls' and Men's Honor 
Clubs. 143 Perhaps similarly, in Kane, although many Hastings's 
student organizations have discriminatory defining interests in their 
bylaws, when considering less controversial groups Hastings interprets 
those references as "informational only."144 
Questioning the focus directed at formal nondiscrimination policies 
is consistent with substantive, antisubordination theories of equality. 
Context matters. Affirmative action is not the same as invidious 
discrimination. The hyper-attention to enforcement of equality claims 
that are not actually sought (the right of the Muslim or Jew or 
Buddhist to join and lead the CLS) shares some traits with a 
formalized, colorblind version of equality, in which formal niceties 
substitute for true equality. The formal right of everyone to join every 
student organization may be a distraction from more serious issues. 
Too much focus on faCially correct, neutral regimes in educational 
institutions may foster an environment in which nobody notices that 
young women are subjected to catcalls in the corridors, or that no 
people of color are on the law review. 
The main value of the institution's insistence that student 
organizations abide by nondiscrimination policies is symbolic: 
insisting that student organizations abide by institutional 
nondiscrimination policies is one way to send a message about the 
value that the institution places on equality, inclusivity, and welcome. 
Institutions can and should find ways to send equally or more 
meaningful messages of nondiscrimination and equality that do not 
suppress First Amendment association rights of student groups. 
141 Cf Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 711 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating KKK 
improperly excluded for discrimination where other discriminating groups allowed to 
receive government benefit). 
142 See Cujjley, 208 F.3d at 711; see also Volokh, supra note 121, at 1968 n.185 
(according to Volokh, "striking down the exclusion of the KKK from a generally 
available government program that purportedly excluded discriminating groups, 
because other less controversial discriminating groups - such as the Knights of 
Columbus - were not excluded"). 
143 See Truth 1,499 F.3d 999, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2007). Why not men and women, 
or boys and girls? 
144 Brief of Appellee at 4, Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 17,2006),2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347. 
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IV. SCHOOLS AND STUDENT GROUPS NEED SEPARATE EXPRESSIVE 
IDENTITIES 
Conceptualizing the expressive identity of the institution as separate 
from the expressive identity of any individual student organization is 
an important step for both First Amendment and equality goals. Being 
more honest about the distinction between the speech of the school 
and the speech of student organizations is a better way to educate 
students about freedom. When the government sets up a limited 
public forum, the speech within the forum is private speech, not 
government speech. Conceptualizing student organizations as 
branches of the school and thereby bound by the school's 
nondiscrimination policy serves up a watered-down version of free 
expression and equality. 
Recognizing and reinforcing that student organizations are private 
and separate from the school or university also helps to accommodate 
the current Establishment Clause doctrine related to religious student 
organizations, protect against the potential erosion of student speech 
in the name of conformity to school or university "mission," and 
bolster the expressive identity of the school or university. 
A. Greater Separation Between Student Groups and Schools Can Protect 
Establishment Clause Values 
A solid, relentless series of Supreme Court Establishment Clause 
decisions, including Widmar v. Vincent,145 Rosenberger,l46 Board of 
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,147 Lamb's Chapel 
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,148 and Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School,149 has minimized Establishment Clause 
145 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
146 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
147 In Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.s. 226 
(1990) (plurality), the Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to 
the Equal Access Act, which creates a right of religious, political, and other kinds of 
noncurricular student organizations to exist at high schools. "To the extent that a 
religious club is merely one of many different student-initiated voluntary clubs, 
students should perceive no message of government endorsement of religion." Id. at 
252. The Court did not reach the question whether the First Amendment requires the 
statutory free speech rights created by the Equal Access Act. 
14B 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
149 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (assuming, per Justice Thomas (rather than deciding), that 
after-school use policies constituted limited public forum, id. at 106; limited public 
forums can be limited in who gets access but "restriction must not discriminate 
against speech on the basis of viewpoint," id. at 106, and "the restriction must be 
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objections and allowed religious, proselytizing student organizations a 
place at public universities, colleges, high schools, and primary 
schools. Separationist arguments have been defeated, and the Court 
has now conclusively established that schools and universities that 
prohibit such religious organizations on Establishment Clause 
grounds are discriminating impermissibly against religion. 
This Establishment Clause shift requires other doctrines and 
attitudes to adjust. Most clearly, the shift in Establishment Clause 
doctrine requires schools and universities to rethink their relationship 
and affiliation with student organizations. Specifically, it requires 
universities and schools to disengage, provide less overSight, and less 
of an imprimatur for student organizations that are recognized as part 
of a limited public forum. Separating the identity of the institution 
from the identity of the student group is necessary to accommodate 
this new, securely entrenched landscape that brings student religious 
organizations to every level of schoolhouse. 15o The presence of 
religious organizations requires schools and universities to address 
seriously the potential for endorsement in their relationships with 
religious student groups. 
Strong arguments support an Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
that would keep all religiOUS activity further away from public schools 
and universities. 151 However, those arguments have not prevailed. 
ReligiOUS student organizations are now constitutionally protected at 
the elementary, secondary, and university levels. Therefore, values of 
'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,'" id. at 107 (citation omitted); 
exclusion of religious group constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination 
following Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel, id. at 107; "religion is the viewpoint from 
which ideas are conveyed," rejecting distinction between worship and other activities, 
id. at 112 n.4). 
150 See, e.g., Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002). Prince concerned the 
attempts of an 11th grader, Tausha Prince, to get recognition for her Christian Bible 
club, called The World Changers, whose purposes included to "address issues of 
interest to students from a religious perspective" and '''celebrating' and 'sharing' the 
Gospel of Jesus Christ." Id. at 1077. The specific issue in the case was whether the 
school district was complying with the Equal Access Act by setting up two tiers of 
students groups, relegating religious groups to a less favorable status. Id. The court 
found that the school district had violated the Equal Access Act and the First 
Amendment (because of viewpoint discrimination in denying access to the yearbook, 
AN equipment, school supplies, and vehicles not covered by the Equal Access Act), 
although there was no right for the religiOUS organization to operate during school 
hours during "student/staff time." Id. at 1087-89 (discussing rationale for finding that 
religious organizations could not operate during school hours). 
151 E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
195,195 (1992). 
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pluralism, freedom of association, and free speech are better served by 
acknowledging that when a school or university establishes a limited 
public forum for student organizations, the student organizations 
constitute private entities, with identities distinct and separate from 
that of the school or university. 
Indeed, these Establishment Clause decisions rest on the 
understanding that student organizations' religious communication in a 
limited public forum constitutes "private" religious speech. For 
example, in rejecting any argument of coercion, Justice Scalia noted in 
his Good News Club concurrence that "so-called 'peer pressure,' if it can 
even be considered coercion, is, when it arises from private activities, 
one of the attendant consequences of a freedom of association that is 
constitutionally protected."152 A student group's speech will be more 
clearly "private" if the school does not attempt to impose its norms and 
values, including those about nondiscrimination. 
This argument that student groups are engaging in "private speech" 
echoes Justice Marshall's admonishment in Mergens. 153 Marshall 
advised that holding the Equal Access Act permissible under the 
Establishment Clause required schools to disassociate more actively 
from the non curricular student groups. The school at issue in 
Mergens, for example, created fora "dedicated to promoting 
fundamental values and citizenship as defined by the school. The 
Establishment Clause does not forbid the operation of the Act in such 
circumstances, but it does require schools to change their relationship 
to their fora so as to disassociate themselves effectively from religious 
clubs' speech."154 The idea that religious student groups have values 
that are consistent with the public educational institution's own values 
is a pretense that risks public endorsement of the religious 
perspective. This reasoning is itself sufficient grounds for faith-based 
student organizations to be exempted from institutional 
nondiscrimination policies. 
152 Good News Club, 533 u.s. at l21 (Scalia,]., concurring) (citations omitted). 
"What is at play here is not coercion, but the compulSion of ideas - and the private 
right to exert and receive that compulsion (or to have one's children receive it) is 
protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses." ld. (citations omitted). "A 
priest has as much liberty to proselytize as a patriot." ld. 
153 496 U.s. 226,262 (1990) (Marshall,]., concurring). 
154 ld. at 262-63. 
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B. Greater Separation Between Student Groups and Schools Protects 
Student Speech Rights 
Not surprisingly, the logic of current First Amendment doctrine 
related to student speech rests on how closely the student speech is 
tied to the institution's speech. Most prominently, for example, the 
concept of "school-sponsored" speech, which the Court understood as 
speech that "students, parents, and other members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school,"155 was 
determinative in Hazelwood. Proponents of robust free speech rights 
for students have an interest in delineating and emphasizing the 
separation of student speech from school or university speech. 
Extending the school's nondiscrimination policy to student 
organizations blurs their independent identities. 
Morse also suggests the pragmatic imperative of separating students' 
speech from the policy or mission of the school or university. Morse 
reaffirmed the centrality of the question whether the school apparently 
endorses "school-sponsored" speech, but found that the school was 
not reasonably appearing to endorse the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" 
banner in question. 156 In Morse, the Court did not accept the 
invitation to permit school officials to censor speech interfering with 
the school's "educational mission,"157 but its apparent willingness to 
subsume students' First Amendment rights into a vague notion of 
school policy is troubling. 15s The Morse Court recognized prevention 
of drug abuse as an important, perhaps compelling governmental 
purpose. 159 Equally important, Morse emphasized that the school had 
an established policy against illegal drug use. Therefore, Morse can be 
criticized as permitting the censorship of student speech because it 
was expressing a viewpoint contrary to the viewpoint of the school, 
even without any apparent endorsement problem. 
155 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
156 "Kuhlmeier does not control this case because no one would reasonably believe 
that Frederick's banner bore the school's imprimatur." Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 
2618, 2627 (2007). In other words, Morse does not rest on an endorsement theory. 
Other than its troubling hints that student speech can be censored if it is contrary to 
official school policy, Morse has little relevance to this question. 
157 ld. at 2637. 
158 A student group formed to engage in illegal drug use can be prohibited even 
without Morse. That is the kind of conduct vs. speech distinction that makes sense. 
Or, imagine a student organization formed to promote the idea of illegal drug use. Or 
using Justice Stevens's tum, imagine a student group formed to advocate legalizing 
marijuana bong hits, whether or not for Jesus. Morse surely does not carve out some 
sort of exception for drug-related student organizations. 
159 Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628. 
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In addition to minimizing the political aspect of the message (how 
can "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" be both advocating drug use and not be 
political speech?), the Morse Court seemed to be reinforcing a 
preferred unity between the viewpoint of the school and the viewpoint 
of the student speaker. A continuing preference for that unity would 
eviscerate student speech protection. Enforcing a unity between the 
nondiscrimination policy of a school and the nondiscrimination policy 
of a student organization would be consistent with this preference for 
unification of viewpoint. The potential unification of institutional and 
student viewpoints is even more wrong in the context of a limited 
public forum. 
C. Greater Separation Between Student Groups and Schools Protects 
Institutional Expressive Association Interests 
Separation of the message of the school or university from the 
message of the student organization enhances the power of the 
school's message where it has a message (e.g., nondiscrimination) and 
enhances the perceived and actual neutrality when the school is 
appropriately neutral. In Rumsfeld v. FAIR,160 the Court had trouble 
seeing the expressive interests of law schools. The Court rejected the 
law schools' argument that the Solomon Amendment impermissibly 
coerced the law schools to violate their own policies of 
nondiscrimination, thereby impermissibly changing the law schools' 
expressive identity. The FAIR Court said that military recruiters 
"come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire 
students - not to become members of the school's expressive 
association."161 The content of the school or university's own 
expressive association will become clearer if it is not muddled with the 
multitude of messages of the student groups that it facilitates through 
its establishment of a public forum. 162 
In his dissent in Walker, Judge Wood worried that: 
the indirect impact of CLS's recognition of a student group 
maintaining such a policy is that [the law school] , 
intentionally or not, may be seen as tolerating such 
discrimination. Given that universities have a compelling 
160 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &: Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.s. 47 
(2006). 
161 Id. at 69. 
162 See also the court's recognition that Georgetown University has an interest in 
not being associated with pro-gay positions in Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown 
University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1, 39 (D.C. 1987). 
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interest in obtaining diverse student bodies, requmng a 
university to include exclusionary groups might undermine 
their ability to attain such diversity.163 
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Judge Wood concluded by using FAIR, suggesting that the CLS "is 
trying to force SID's Law School to accept a 'member' (that is, a 
recognized student organization) that SIU does not desire. The whole 
point of this litigation is to transform CLS from an outsider, like the 
military recruiters in FAIR, into an insider."I64 Whether or not it 
admits non-Christian members, no Christian group should have 
"insider" status in a public institution. Conceptualizing the expressive 
identities of the institution and the student group as having very 
distinct voices would better address Judge Wood's concern about the 
blurring of the two. 
In short, a renewed emphasis on the distinction between the school 
or university as speaker, and the student organization as speaker, 
should enable a stronger institutional viewpoint. The student 
organization can be religious, political, or otherwise ideological. The 
public school or university cannot have a religious perspective, but it 
can have a strong position on nondiscrimination, even when some 
student organizations do not. Indeed, the institution's viewpoint that 
LGBT students are full members of the high school or law school 
community arguably would be diminished if it appears to embrace 
ideologically antihomosexuality student organizations, requiring only 
that they agree to abide by formal nondiscrimination policies. 
v. LIMITING PRINCIPLES AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Public forums set up by schools and universities for student 
expression are relatively rare and precious free speech zones. 
Permitting even exclusionary student expressive associations to 
flourish does not need to lead to either the evisceration of institutional 
nondiscrimination policies or creation of hostile educational 
environments. However, limiting principles are necessary to make 
sure this is so. 
163 Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 875 (7th Cir. 2006) (Wood,]., 
dissenting). 
164 Id. at 876. 
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A. Rights of Exclusion Should Be Limited to Student Expressive 
Associations Within a Public Forum Whose Core Identity Requires the 
Exclusion 
The expressive association freedom to control membership should 
be limited to constraints on membership and leadership that are 
central to the mission and belief structure of the organization. In 
other words, the chess club defines itself by interest in chess, not by 
religiOUS faith. Of course, there could be a Christian Chess Club. 
The Board of Regents of the University of California argued in its 
brief in Kane that exemption from nondiscrimination policies for 
student organizations would be no different from a guest lecturer 
limiting his or her students to those of a specific race or religion. 165 
The example is inapposite, however. The lecturer is presenting a 
program on behalf of the institution, whose own policies of 
inclusiveness should apply. The group that gathers to hear a guest 
lecturer has no expressive association interests protected by the First 
Amendment. Thus, the school or university has the ability to require 
open attendance at a lecture. Recognizing the core association rights 
of expressive student groups to control their own membership or 
leadership criteria does not require abandonment of institutional 
control in any other area. It does not even require any change in 
policies that student group meetings be open to all students. 
B. Rights of Exclusion Should Be Limited to Membership and Leadership 
of the Student Organization, Not Necessarily Attendance at Meetings 
First Amendment protection for exclusionary membership and 
leadership requirements does not Similarly mandate that a student 
group may restrict attendance at its events and meetings. Leaders and 
members have control over the agenda and conduct of a meeting or 
event, but the same principles of autonomy over message do not 
support exclusionary poliCies regarding mere presence. Therefore, in 
creating a public forum of student groups, the school or university may 
limit the organizations' membership and leadership to students, and 
may require that general meetings and events be open to all students. 
165 Brief for the Board of Regents as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hastings at 3, 
Christian Legal Soc'y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 ]SW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2006), 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27347. 
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C. Rights of Exclusion Should Not Carry Over to Student Groups' 
Commercial Activities 
The First Amendment offers less protection for expressive 
associations whose exclusionary policies undermine economic 
opportunities for those who are excluded. 166 Therefore, the CLS 
would have no right to conduct a members-only job fair, for example. 
Similarly, Professor Volokh notes that exclusion from student groups 
is not likely to cause systematic harm such as depriving someone of an 
education, livelihood, or shelter. 167 
D. Institutional Prohibitions on Harassment Would Continue in Full 
Force Within the School or University 
Exclusion from a private student organization is not the same thing as 
targeted harassment. Protecting student safety and freedom from 
harassment will continue to be an important aspect of school or 
university culture and duty. In fact, separating the expressive identity of 
the institution from the expressive identity of the student organization 
may free the institution to adopt strong protections, such as for students 
who are sexual minorities, beyond those required by statute. 
E. Tinker's Limitation for Disruptive Activity Applies 
Under Tinker, student expressive associations have no right to 
conduct their affairs in ways that "materially and substantially disrupt 
the work and discipline of the school. "168 The principles limiting the 
power of heckler's vetoes should assure that opponents of the 
exclUSionary student group would not be able to shut it down through 
disruptive activities. 169 However, the Tinker requirement would also 
apply with full force to disruptive activities by the student 
166 See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.s. 1, 18-20 
(1988) (O'Connor, )., concurring) (holding that predominantly commercial 
organizations are not entitled to First Amendment association right to be free from 
antidiscrimination provisions); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 
481 U.S. 537,549 (1987) (recognizing compelling governmental interest in ensuring 
that women have equal access to business contacts); Roberts v. U.s. Jaycees, 468 U.s. 
609,631,634 (1984) (O'Connor,)., concurring) (emphasizing minimal constitutional 
protection for commercial association). 
167 See Volokh, supra note 121, at 1927. 
168 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.s. 503, 513 (1969); see also 
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618,2626 (2007) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.s. at 513). 
169 See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd 
County, 258 F. Supp. 2d 667,689-90 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
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organization itself. For example, the Hsu court suggested that if the 
club were reduced to squabbling, rather than becoming entangled with 
questions of religious worthiness, the school could disband the club 
under the "materially disruptive" test of Tinker.l7O 
F. ExclUSionary Student Groups Should Be Required to Disclose Their 
ExclUSionary Policies 
Although purely private expressive associations enjoy rights of 
privacy about information like membership lists,171 expressive 
associations in the public school or university public forum do not 
have such rights. Institutions can condition recognition of any 
student group on that group's disclosure and announcement of 
membership and leadership policies. Student groups wishing to 
discriminate should be required to announce the basis of their 
discriminatory policy.172 Being forced to announce one's exclusionary 
principles could inhibit those principles from taking hold, with the 
requirement of articulation operating as a moderating influence. 173 
Moreover, perhaps in many ways excluded students benefit from 
knowing the hostile attitudes of their fellow students, rather than 
having them hidden under a very thin veneer of state-imposed pseudo-
respect, such as within pockets of political support for LGBT rights. 1H 
G. Parental Permission Slips Could Be Required for Student 
Organizations That Are Not Open to All Students 
Depending on the age of the students, schools could require 
parental permission slips for all student organizations, or for any that 
have exclusionary policies. In Good News Club, Justice Thomas found 
no Establishment Clause violation in part because "the Club's 
meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by the school, 
170 Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No.3, 85 F.3d 839, 867 (2d Cir. 1996). 
I7l See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.s. 449, 462 (1958) (recognizing associational 
and speech rights not to disclose membership lists). 
172 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Facilitating Boycotts of Discriminatory Organizations 
Through an Informed Association Statute, 87 MINN. L. REV. 481, 496 (2002). 
173 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 848 n.35 ("[TJhe implicit requirement that 
one must articulate clearly a bigoted message in order to retain the ability to exclude 
unwanted members for bigoted reasons may serve as a disincentive to discriminate for 
those groups who wish to forswear a reputation of bigotry."). 
174 Regarding the faux-equality of imposing nondiscriminatory membership 
requirements, id. at 878 ("Forced methods of generating culture suffer authenticity 
problems that undercut its value."). 
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and open to any student who obtained parental consent, not just to 
Club Members."175 Justice Thomas claimed that the required parental 
permission means that any coercion would be of the parents, not of 
the elementary school children. 176 Whatever the strength of Justice 
Thomas's coercion analysis in Good News Club, parental permission 
slips could moderate the potentially disruptive or hostile impact of 
exclusionary student organizations. 
H. If Any Group Came to "Dominate the Forum," the First Amendment 
Right to Exclude Would Evaporate Along with the Public Forum 
In general, the answer to exclusionary student groups is more 
student groups.177 If any Single student organization became so big 
that it "dominated the forum," the public forum would have 
disappeared and the independence of the student organization from 
the school or university would have been destroyedYs In that case, 
the dominant student organization would no longer be private and 
independent, and would lose any expressive association right to 
control membership. 
I. The School or University Should Disclaim Any Control over Student 
Organizations' Exclusionary Policies 
The school or university can prOvide specific disclaimers that explain 
the constitutional rights of expressive associations and alert everyone 
that student organizations are not within the general nondiscrimination 
175 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.s. 98, 113 (2001). 
176 Id. at 115. 
177 See Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 878 (explaining that "the excluded have the viable 
option to generate robust associations of their own and to create their own sites of 
culture and mutual recognition and trust," but noting that "[tlhese alternatives may ... 
lack the social cachet of, and social power wielded by, majority, mainstream groups"). 
178 Good News Club, 533 U.s. at 127-28 (Breyer,]., concurring) (quoting Capitol 
Square Review &: Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.s. 753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor, j., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Justice Breyer's concurrence in 
Good News Club emphasizes the procedural posture (reversal of grant of summary 
judgment for school district) and suggests that certain facts, "[tlhe time of day, the 
age of the children . . . and other specific circumstances are relevant in helping to 
determine whether, in fact, the Club 'so dominates' the 'forum' that, in the children's 
minds, 'a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of 
approval.'" Id. at 128; e.g., id. at 134, 140 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Rosenberger 
v. Rector &: Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.s. 819, 851 (1995) (O'Connor, j., 
concurring); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.s. 263,274 (1981) (noting that Establishment 
Clause did not bar religious student group from using public university's meeting 
space for worship as well as discussion)). 
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policies for access to educational opportunities. 179 Such disclaimers can 
minimize any apparent endorsement of discrimination. 
]. School Officials with Younger Students Have Greater Leeway to 
Control Student Organizations 
Although the general principles that I have described are applicable 
to both high school and university students, the specific 
implementation can differ because high school students do not 
necessarily have the full First Amendment rights of university students 
and adults. 180 The age of the students in question, whether in grade 
school, high school, or university, can determine the depth of First 
Amendment protections required. 181 More infringements may be 
justified at the elementary than at the high school level, and more at 
the high school than at the university level. 182 
CONCLUSION 
The oppression of and discrimination against LGBT youth in many 
schools and communities should not be minimized. Interpreting the 
First Amendment rights of student expressive associations to extend to 
excluSionary practices may cause harm to the excluded students. 
Freedom of speech causes harm. Pornography causes harm, as does 
179 In Widmar, for example, the university published a student handbook with an 
explicit disclaimer that "the university's name will not 'be identified in any way with 
the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its 
members.'" Good News Club, 533 U.s. at 142 (Souter,]., dissenting) (quoting Widmar 
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,274 n. 14 (1981)). 
180 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 880-87,882 (arguing for right of associations 
to exclude "all presuppose an agent with life experience and at least the maturity age 
brings, one who has had opportunities to develop her autonomous capacities such 
that she may be reasonably thought to be responsible for the exercise of her 
autonomy"). 
181 See Good News Club, 533 U.s. at 142-43 (Souter,]., dissenting) (noting "special 
protection required for those in the elementary grades in the school forum" (citing 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.s. 573, 620 n.69 
(1989)). Justice Souter continues, "We have held the difference between college 
students and grade school pupils to be a 'distinction [that) warrants a difference in 
constitutional results.'" ld. at 143 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.s. 573, 584 
n.5 (1987)). 
182 See id. at 115 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.s. 373, 390 
(1985)) ("[S)ymbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to influence 
children of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently 
are the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice."); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.s. 577, 592 (1992) (explaining that elementary children are more 
impressionable than older children). 
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other protected hate speech. 183 I am hopeful, though, that students 
who are harmed by exclusion from student organizations will take 
advantage of the same culture of free expression in multiple ways, 
whether by forming other organizations or through individual speech. 
People who are discriminated against have a powerful ally in the 
First Amendment. The amazing importance of the Equal Access Act184 
for LGBT youth, and for LGBT justice generally, provides an 
important lesson. Congress enacted the Equal Access Act to make 
high school safe for traditional religious groups, and it is doing that, 
sometimes to the detriment of LGBT youth. However, the equally big, 
perhaps even bigger beneficiary of the Equal Access Act is LGBT gay-
straight alliances, of which there are now thousands in high schools 
across the country.18S The widespread presence of those pro-gay 
student organizations has created safety for countless LGBT youth, 
and has changed public attitudes about LGBT justice. Overwhelming 
evidence shows that attitudes about homosexuality are significantly 
related to age, with younger adults consistently more supportive of 
strong freedom for sexual minorities. 186 This remarkable change in 
attitudes has been fueled in part by popular culture, and in part by the 
presence of organized LGBT organizations in high schools and 
colleges. Those organizations have been able to exist in places where 
dominant public opinion does not support LGBT freedom only 
because First Amendment freedoms have protected them. Thus, 
recent history shows that progressive change in the climate for LGBT 
people, especially youth, is fueled by free speech and expressive 
IB3 See Shiffrin, supra note 12, at 878 (explaining harms of exclusion "are a real, 
substantial cost of the protection of freedom of association, just as there are similar 
costs associated with other protected forms of expression that permit the voicing of 
hateful or ignorant sentiments"). 
IB4 20 U.s.c. § 4071(a), (b) (2000). The Equal Access Act, passed in 1984, 
requires public secondary schools that permit any student-initiated non-curricular 
student group to allow other non-curricular student groups, however unpopular. 20 
U.s.c. § 4071 (1984). 
IB5 See, e.g., Straights &: Gays for Equal. v. Osseo Area Schs., 471 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 
2006) (upholding right of Gay Straight Alliance pursuant to Equal Access Act); White 
County High Sch. Peers v. White County Sch. Dist., 2:06-CV-29-WCO, 2006 U.s. 
Oist. LEXIS 47955 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2006) (same); Boyd County High Sch. Gay 
Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667 (£.0. Ky. 2003) (same). 
IB6 E.g., THE HARRIS POLL #91, Sept. 18,2007 (explaining that 49% of those ages 18 
to 35 support gay rights, compared to 37% of those ages 43 to 61 and 31% of those 62 
and older); Tolerance for Gay Rights at High-Water Mark, GALLUP POLL, May 29, 2007 
(noting that 75% of ages 18 to 34 agreed that homosexuality is "acceptabie alternative 
lifestyle" compared to 45% of ages 55 and above). 
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association rights. That is the lesson in freedom and equality that we 
should be teaching our students. 
